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This thesis examines the effectiveness of the 
U.S. Navy's enlisted personnel development policies. 
Regression analysis is utilized to assess longitudinal data 
from the 1979, 1982, and 1985 Navy enlisted cohorts. The 
thesis evaluates the potential of these data to predict the 
performance of enlisted personnel. A major focus of the thesis 
is the differential impact of racial/ethnic background on 
performance. Some light is shed on the Navy's equal 
opportunity programs with respect to their short- and long- 
term influence on advancement rates for different 
racial/ethnic groups in the three cohorts. The results of the 
empirical analysis support the conclusion that racial/ethnic 
minorities tend to promote to pay grades E-4, E-5, and E-6 
more slowly than non-minorities. However, the magnitude of the 
difference decreases for more recent cohorts and for promotion 
to the more senior ranks. The data suggest that the Navy's 
equal opportunity programs may have played a role in improving 
promotion times for racial/ethnic minority members. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A.  OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM 
1. Discussion 
Many countries have cut their annual military budgets in 
an effort to reduce public expenditures. This is also true for 
the United States. Using resources in the most efficient way 
is, and will always be, a key issue for military management. 
At the same time, management of military personnel must 
regularly reexamine manpower policy to optimize the quantity, 
mix, and quality of the force's personnel, to minimize related 
costs, and to adapt to sociodemographic changes in the 
population. 
Current as well as future practice and policies need to 
be carefully and repeatedly evaluated with respect to their 
effect on military personnel. This thesis focuses on the 
effects of race and ethnicity on the promotion opportunities 
of enlisted personnel. The research is intended to assess two 
areas: 1.) promotion opportunities for different racial/ethnic 
groups; and 2.) the influence of equal opportunity programs on 
promotion outcomes, 
2. Reason Why Situation Needs Attention 
Management systems in government-run, non-profit 
organizations are assumed to select and promote fairly, that 
is, to discriminate solely on the basis of performance. But 
the problem on hand is the absence of an automatic control 
system to ensure fairness in promotions. 
In fact, as Gorman (1993) writes: "[The] government may- 
engage in much more unfair discrimination than private 
businesses. When business discriminates against individuals on 
any basis other than productivity, market mechanisms impose an 
inescapable penalty on profits .... While government 
practicing unfair discrimination face occasional losses only 
if their activities attract public disfavor, the losses 
incurred by businesses mount with each and every sale" (Gorman 
in Henderson, 1993, p. 470). Therefore, a method is necessary 
that allows the military personnel manager to ensure 
compliance with equal opportunity policies and the successful 
implementation of personnel policies. 
B. OBJECTIVES OP THE RESEARCH 
This work examines the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy's 
enlisted personnel development policies. The study is 
organized in two parts. First, regression analysis is utilized 
to assess longitudinal data from three cohorts of Navy 
enlisted personnel (groups entering the Navy in 1979, 1982, 
and 1985) and the potential of these data to predict 
performance. Also, the differential impact of racial/ethnical 
background on performance (while controlling for other 
sociodemographic variables) is addressed. Second, an attempt 
is made to address the short- and long-term influence of the 
Navy's equal opportunity programs on advancement rates for 
different racial/ethnic groups in the three cohorts. 
C. ANALYTICAL RESOURCES 
Existing studies of promotion are reviewed to understand 
the promotion process in general and specifically in the 
Navy enlisted ranks. In addition, the literature is used as a 
basis for specifying the empirical promotion models. 
The data for the thesis were provided by the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Monterey, California. The data 
reflect the entire population of the enlisted force that 
entered the Navy in 1979, 1982, and 1985. Therefore, there 
have been no sampling considerations. The thesis uses 
regression analysis of these data to specify and estimate 
models of promotion for each of the three cohorts. Also, the 
differential impact of racial/ethnic status on performance, 
while controlling for other sociodemographic variables, is 
evaluated. 
D.  ORGANIZATION OP THE STUDY 
A broad literature review in Chapter II establishes the 
background information about promotion opportunities for 
enlisted Navy personnel, the impact of racial/ethnic status on 
advancement, and the equal opportunity programs employed by 
the Navy. Chapter III describes the statistical model and the 
research methodology that has been utilized. The theoretical 
and empirical models are developed together with the findings 
of the preceding chapters. Chapter IV presents the results of 
the quantitative analysis. The chapter starts with the 
application of simple statistical procedures to describe the 
data sets and to compare different aspects across cohorts as 
well as across different attributes. The chapter concludes 
with a thorough examination of the characteristics and 
qualities of the models. 
Chapter V presents conclusions derived from the 
multivariate analysis. In addition, it critiques the 
weaknesses and strengths of the data and the study and 
assesses the influence of equal opportunity programs on 
promotion opportunities for minorities in the U.S. Navy. 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL 
Promotion is a fairly automatic procedure for enlisted 
personnel prior to the rank E-3, and it depends largely on the 
fulfillment of training requirements. Not everybody gets his 
or her training immediately. Some enlistees are assigned to 
units directly after boot camp. These young men and women are 
trained on the job and may attend "A" school later to qualify 
for assignment to a specific occupation. Because of this dual 
system, one cannot recognize solely from the rank of a person 
lower than E-4 whether he or she has qualified for an 
occupational specialty. Therefore, ranks E-l through E-3 are 
excluded from the promotion analysis of this study. 
Promotion to Petty Officer Third Class (E-4) depends on 
qualification for an occupational specialty. Table 1 refers to 
the rank structure, the rank titles, and minimum time-in-rank 
criteria for promotion. In addition, promotion criteria 
include the following: 
Criteria for advancement in all petty officer ranks 
include Navy-wide competitive written examinations, 
demonstrated proficiency in assigned duties within the 
occupational specialty, and a written periodic 
performance evaluation and recommendation of the 
commanding officer. All eligible personnel compete for 
advancement to fill existing vacancies in the total Navy 
allowance. In other words, advancement in a particular 
occupation specialty is contingent upon the Navy's 
requirement for personnel in that specialty as well as 
demonstrated performance by the candidate. 
Selection to [Chief Petty Officer] CPO, [Senior 
Chief Petty Officer] SCPO, and [Master Chief Petty 
Officer] MSPO is accomplished by a selection board 
convened annually by the Chief of Navy Personnel. 
Candidates who have successfully competed in the Navy- 
wide examinations have their records placed before the 
board for consideration. Again, the total number selected 
in each rank and occupation specialty is based on total 
Navy vacancies. (Zucca, 1984, p. 5) 
Table I Promotion Advancement Times by Enlisted Pay Grade and 
Title 






6 months 6 months 
E-3 Seaman 6 months 6 months 
E-4 Petty Officer 
Third Class 
2 years 9 months 
E-5 Petty Officer 
Second Class 
3 years 1 year 
E-6 Petty Officer 
First Class 
7 years 3 years 
E-7 Chief Petty 
Officer 
10 years 3 years 
E-8 Senior Chief 
Petty Officer 
13 years 3 years 
E-9 Master Chief 
Petty Officer 
16 years 3 years 
Source: Adapted from Zucca, 1984, pp. 4-6. 
Cooke and Quester (1992) point out the importance of the 
correct selection of entry-level personnel in the military. 
Because the armed forces do not rely on lateral entry and 
incur significant up-front training costs, early 
identification of the successful future recruit is a key 
element for personnel management. The same argument holds for 
promotion practices. 
Prior to the work of Cooke and Quester, research linked 
a history of unemployment, frequent job changes, a lack of job 
experience, and the lack of a high school diploma to a higher 
probability of attrition. Cooke and Quester went one step 
further by establishing a relationship between entry level 
characteristics (such as age, Armed Forces Qualification Test 
[AFQT] score, high school graduation [HSDG], participation in 
the Delayed Entry Program [DEP], etc.) and early promotion, 
promotion to E-4, and retention. 
They developed a "maximum likelihood" (logit) regression 
model, using data on a sample of male recruits with no prior 
service, who entered the'Navy between 1978 and 1982. The 
results of the study indicate that possession of a high school 
diploma, a higher AFQT score, and entering through the DEP all 
indicate substantially better "success" in the Navy. This is 
true for all three models of "success," including completion 
of the first term of enlistment, promotion, and retention. 
Home (1987) explains the importance of the AFQT score 
for performance predictions: 
Individuals with higher AFQT scores are more likely 
to acquire the skills and knowledge necessary to perform 
their military assignments. The test scores measure 
trainability with some amount of measurement error, 
because true trainability is not observed. . . . The 
relationship of interest is therefore between AFQT score 
and the available performance data. (Home, 1987, p.444) 
Home's final model describes the results on the Army's 
Skill Qualification Test (a substitute measure of performance) 
as a function of trainability, education, experience, 
training, gender, and race. Education is expressed as either 
holding a high school diploma (HSG) or not (NHSG) and is 
viewed as an indication of arithmetic, reading, writing, 
reasoning and other skills useful on the job. Experience is 
measured as the time spent in service, and training stands for 
the dummy variable "training in the same Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS)." The race variable distinguishes between 
white and nonwhite. As Home (19 87) writes: 
The variables statistically significant across 
equations are AFQT score and rank. The coefficients on 
AFQT score are quite similar across all MOS's, ranging 
from .15 to .20 . . . . Race is significant in two 
equations [i.e., MOSs], while high school diploma status 
is not significant in any. (Home, 1987, p.451) 
B.  THE IMPACT OF RACIAL/ETHNIC STATUS 
Butler (1976), in "Blacks and the Military," was one of 
the first authors to evaluate different promotion times 
between black and white enlistees. He was interested in 
possible unequal treatment of racial groups as an indication 
of potential institutional discrimination. His theory is that 
the Army, prior to 1976, was using specific overt and covert 
evaluation criteria, which led to a lower proportion of blacks 
in the higher enlisted ranks. 
Prior studies and surveys revealed that blacks 
systematically needed more time to move up. Although other 
research suspected a linkage between the inequality in 
promotion time and racial/ethnic discrimination, Butler's 
analysis design, for the first time, controlled for 
demographic variables (in his case, education, AFQT score, and 
occupation type). Using "months in service to make current 
grade" as the dependent variable, Butler employed cross 
tabulations for the comparisons of the mean time-in-service to 
grade for both groups. 
After evaluating the statistical results, Butler (1976) 
concludes: "Little support is given by the data presented for 
the argument that racial inequality is to be explained by the 
failure of Blacks to meet universalistic criteria." In 
addition, he finds that whites are generally not more 
qualified; yet, it took blacks systematically more months in 
service to make grade. Butler ultimately finds that there is 
discrimination on the basis of race in the Army. 
This statement is contrary to the findings of Cooke and 
Quester (1992), whose study indicates that black and Hispanic 
recruits, holding all other characteristics constant, have a 
slightly higher chance of completing their first term, of 
getting promoted, and of reenlisting. One possible reason why 
Butler's findings are different may relate to the timing of 
the studies. Cooke and Quester looked at groups during a time 
when "equal opportunity" was much more vigilant. On the other 
hand, the reason could also lie in the specific methodology 
Butler is using. The latter point is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Robinson and Prevette (1992), in "Disparities in Minority 
Promotion Rates: A Total Quality Approach, Fiscal Years 1987- 
1991," point out the existence of promotion rates that differ 
systematically, depending on the race of the enlisted person. 
The Navy E-7 promotion board is found especially "productive" 
in creating promotion differences between men of different 
races. 
The authors employ control charts in their analysis and 
find: 
The U.S. Navy E-7 board has been the most 
significantly unequal board for minority promotion rates. 
... In both years [1991 and 1990], all minority males 
were promoted at below the board average. Black males 
were below the lower 3-sigma control limit in both years. 
White males were above the upper 3-sigma control limit in 
both years. (Robinson and Prevette, 1992, p. 10) 
The observation that promotion rates for minorities 
differ from those for non-minorities is obvious. But, the 
attempt of Robinson and Prevette to indicate statistical 
significance may not have been successful. The control chart 
technique relies on a base value that serves as comparison to 
individual data. Unfortunately, the average advancement rate 
for all personnel who have been "in-zone" for promotion during 
a given fiscal year may not be appropriate. 
Robinson and Prevette (1992) apparently do not take into 
account that the promotion process is everything but a random 
selection process. For example, the selection board members 
may try as hard as they wish, but there will still be 
individual or collective attitudes present during the process. 
In addition, depending on the specialty, there may be 
different advancement opportunities for each occupation. 
Furthermore, preferences of individuals may have brought 
individuals with either similar background characteristics 
and/or similar preferences into the same ratings. The list of 
examples could go on and on as to why one should not assume a 
random process as the basis for promotion rate comparisons. 
Particularly important is that selection is intended to be 
based on past, and predicted future, performance.Finally, 
selectivity bias is'one of the strongest arguments against the 
method used by Robinson and Prevette. The reasons why 
individuals (select to) stay in the Navy to a particular 
promotion point may differ systematically by minority status. 
The total quality approach may be one way of analyzing 
promotion processes, but the use of a control chart does not 
seem to be helpful, especially since it visualizes differences 
in outcome, not differences in promotion opportunities per se. 
The fairest promotion system may not necessarily mean that 
every person or every single demographic group will be 
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promoted at exactly the same rate. 
C.  EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS 
The Navy's Affirmative Action (AA) goal is to ensure 
overall representativeness and to place more minority members 
in underrepresented ratings. The Secretary of the Navy has 
stated: 
Progress requires an absolute commitment to equal 
opportunity combined with aggressive command efforts to 
detect and eliminate all existence of discrimination. 
Prompt effective action to counter discrimination is the 
responsibility of every member of the Department of the 
Navy and is essential to the total success of our equal 
opportunity program. Race, color, religion, national 
origin, or gender are not considerations affecting the 
value or quality of life for Navy personnel. (Secretary of 
the Navy, 1989, p.l) 
The Chief of Naval Operations has likewise stated: 
An environment of equal opportunity is essential to 
attaining and maintaining high state of morale, 
discipline, and military effectiveness. Command 
monitoring of internal practices . . . enable the 
commander, commanding officer, officer in charge or 
supervisor to take prompt positive action to counter 
discriminatory practices. (Chief of Naval Operations, 
1989, p. 1) 
These statements by Navy officials also point out the 
importance of a control system that monitors practices such as 
actual promotions in the enlisted force. This is where the 
present research comes in, by providing a concept for 
monitoring promotions and explaining possible discrepancies in 
advancement opportunities that are tied to ethnicity and/or 
race. 
The absence of a comparable proportion of minority groups 
in the Navy, as well as on specific jobs, would be a first 
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indication for the absence of equal opportunities for these 
minorities. As Eitelberg (1988) puts it: 
One gauge for evaluating the "representativeness" of 
racial/ethnic groups in various jobs is the racial/ethnic 
composition of the entire enlisted force .... Perfect 
representation in any single job (or category of jobs) 
occurs when a group's proportion within that job matches 
its proportion in the entire enlisted force. . . . All 
things being equal (which they seldom if ever are, in any 
organizational setting), one would expect to find a 
random or representative distribution of persons from the 
enlisted force throughout the available jobs; 
consequently, the absence of perfect representation 
suggests that all things are not equal or that some 
intervening factors have influenced the outcomes of the 
job assignment [and promotion] process. (Eitelberg, 1988) 
Assuming that promotion rates differ, depending on 
career paths or ratings, one cannot directly compare 
individuals or groups of enlistees from different specialties, 
unless the proportion of minorities in all specific ratings is 
the same as the overall distribution over all jobs or even in 
the entire population (Zucca and Gorman, 1986). This argument 
may be viewed as a "practicality" problem for this research. 
The next chapter draws on this problem to develop a correct 
methodological approach in assessing performance opportunities 
for different racial/ethnic groups. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Affirmative action programs were established to promote 
a specific outcome that would not occur without some 
intervention. Therefore, a control mechanism is necessary that 
informs the personnel planner whether there is a need for more 
or less affirmative action. This study explores the possible 
effects of these programs and analyzes possible differential 
treatment in promotion based on minority status that cannot be 
explained by personal background characteristics (such as 
aptitude,, schooling, training, occupational placement, and 
preferences, among others). In addition, this thesis seeks to 
develop a model that explains and predicts promotion outcomes. 
Butler's (1976) research design limited the reliability 
of his results. Cross tabulations can be interpreted only when 
very few independent variables are introduced at the same 
time. In addition, one may be tempted to artificially 
categorize some independent variables in order to reduce the 
complexity of the model. Both actions may oversimplify the 
problem and lead to ambiguous results. Multiple regression, on 
the other hand, simultaneously considers more independent 
variables. This procedure helps to overcome the shortcomings 
of Butler's statistical approach. 
Furthermore, observed differences in promotion rates by 
minority status may not be significant (in a statistical 
sense) once other factors are held constant. Different 
advancement rates will be due to more than random variation. 
Only a statistical model that can attribute statistical 
significance to a difference in promotion rates is able to 
measure the success and/or usefulness of affirmative action 
programs. Regression analysis is a statistical procedure that 
can produce the necessary information. The following chapters 
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draw on multiple regression analysis to explain systematic 
differences in promotion rates. 
A.  ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE AND MODEL 
When evaluating performance indicators for their ability 
to predict successful performance, one needs to carefully 
select possible explanatory variables which theoretically 
might have an influence on the performance of an individual. 
Also, the correct functional form of the regression model must 
be determined. A squared explanatory variable, as for example 
age-squared or years-of-education-squared, might be mirroring 
real world dependencies better than the non-transformed age 
and education measures. This is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
For the dependent variable there is the possibility to 
model the time someone needed to get promoted to a specific 
rank. Or, one may model the probability of being promoted to 
a specific rank. And, as a third variation, one may look into 
the probability of early promotion, say, earlier than the 
average time needed. 
Considering a military career, the ultimate question is 
whether a person gets promoted or not. But, modeling the 
chance of getting promoted to a specific rank will not get the 
information about how well someone does, given that he or she 
made the cut. Therefore, the more defined model has to 
quantify quality differences due to differences in duration to 
a specific rank. When using time-to-promotion as a dependent 
variable, an OLS (ordinary least square) regression is to be 
considered superior to a Logit regression, because it will not 
oversimplify the data by squeezing them into a dichotomous 
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dependent variable. Again, one would lose valuable information 
by not considering the performance differences indicated by a 
specific promotion time versus a binary variable indicating 
being promoted faster than average (yes or no). 
B.  THE RELEVANT SAMPLE 
The database used in this thesis is a file of entry 
cohorts for fiscal years 1979, 1982, and 1985. The file 
contains longitudinal data on enlisted personnel who entered 
the Navy during these fiscal years. The year 1979 represents 
one of the first years with sizable minority groups other than 
blacks. And, during this year, due to the AFQT misnorming 
incident, accessions represented a wider range of quality than 
normally found. Thus, there were accessions of persons with 
less than the minimum required score on the AFQT. The year 
19 85 is the most recent year that still gives enough 
longitudinal data with the remaining time span of seven years 
for the records. Fiscal 1982 was selected for study because it 
is the midpoint between 1979 and 1985 and provides a good 
basis of comparison. 
Variables used in the analysis that are from the MEPCOM 
edit file are coded at the individual's point of entry into 
the military and are re-coded annually to the year 1992. 
Variables from the Active-Duty Master LOSS file are only coded 
for persons who separated during the time the cohort is 
tracked (through 1992). Persons who never separated during 
this time period have zero values for variables in the LOSS 
file. In summary, the cohort database contains background and 
entry data for the start year as well as additional data for 
the same persons for subsequent years, as long as they are in 
the Navy or up to 1992, whichever occurs first. Since these 
15 
data cover the entire accession population, the results of 
this work may automatically be viewed as the result for the 
population. 
Appendix A shows the contents of the data files. Appendix 
C shows the variable names, the number of occurrences, the 
mean values, and the standard deviations, as well as the 
minimum and maximum values. These data were obtained from the 
MEPCOM edit file and the Active-Duty Master LOSS file. 
The interested reader may also refer to Appendix B, which 
contains the SAS coding used to create the data file for 
analyzing the 1979 cohort. The coding for the cohorts 1982 and 
1985 are very similar. All three sets are then merged into the 
pooled data set. 
In addition, Appendix B displays the restrictions imposed 
upon the data. All missing values have been eliminated. 
Persons whose data suggests they had separated before they 
entered the system are excluded. Also, in order to "create" 
similar conditions concerning the quality and the background 
of entering recruits, persons who served a term or more 
before, and were reenlisting when they re-entered the Navy for 
a second time, are dropped from the data base. 
All variables indicating different ethnic and/or racial 
characteristics are recoded to suit the regression 
environment. Since they are all of nominal character, they are 
transformed into dummy value variables stating the quality as 
being either there (= 1) or not there (= 0) . This way, the 
statistical programs are not implying an ordinal or even 
proportional relationship between the different racial or 
ethnic groups. Actually, the recoding requires even to 
distinguish between the different cohorts, because the same 
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value for a specific variable may have different meanings from 
cohort to cohort. 
The original data sets indicate the point in time of 
specific events (i.e., they state the date of the event). For 
example, someone's promotion to E-4 might have occurred on 
June 12th, 1983. This created some difficulties, since not all 
members of a cohort join on the same day. Therefore, the 
statistical program needs to be able to calculate the time 
span between date of entry into the Navy and the date of a 
specific event such as promotion to E-4. Ignoring that fact 
would have meant not to account for a time span of nearly 12 
months (which is the difference between the earliest and the 
latest entry into a given cohort). The code treats all events 
relative to the entry date into the Navy (i.e., in number of 
months, after the accession date). 
This is basically also true for the promotion time line, 
with the added difficulty that the original data set may have 
the same event (again, promotion to E-4 may serve as a good 
example) recorded several times. Since it often takes more 
than a year to get promoted to the next highest rank, all the 
years in between two succeeding promotion dates are coded with 
the date of the last promotion. The program needs to be able 
to distinguish between data that are repetitions and new 
information that is important for the analysis. 
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C.  THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
Since performance in itself is not measurable, one needs 
to find a criterion that enables the personnel planner to 
distinguish between different levels of performance. One 
possible criterion in the military environment may be the 
performance evaluation report, or a series of performance 
evaluation reports. Unfortunately, these documents may be 
biased and, to some degree, may also depend on the non- 
professional relationship between the evaluator and the person 
evaluated. Therefore, one needs to look for a performance 
indicator variable that is as independent of personal bias as 
possible. 
In addition, a good performance evaluation in the early 
years of one's career may not necessarily be linked to 
outstanding future achievements. For example, one may have 
personal preferences that hinder the person from excellent 
performance on future jobs, although he or she may be capable 
of a high level of performance. 
Both difficulties can be resolved if one chooses the 
time-in-service that one needs to be promoted to a specific 
rank as the dependent variable. This variable minimizes the 
personal bias of superiors, includes actual success on the 
job, and, at the same time, indicates the future performance 
level, given that the circumstances remain about the same. 
The Navy promotion system is based on the availability of 
vacancies in the next higher rank, which means one needs to 
have a vacant billet in an occupation at the next higher rank 
for a given individual to be promoted. "Time-to-Rank" is an 
excellent measure to also account for the availability of 
billets in a given occupational hierarchy. 
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This thesis selects "Time-in-service to E-4," "Time-in- 
service to E-5," and "Time-in-service to E-6" as the dependent 
variables for the models. There is not much sense in selecting 
a variable of less than "Time-in-service to E-4" because, up 
to E-3, the promotion process is based on successful 
completion of training rather than individual contributions. 
In other words, promotion up to E-3 does not indicate personal 
excellence on the job. Because this paper is also interested 
in the differential effect of belonging to different ethnic 
and/or racial groups, it is not meaningful to employ- 
statistical models with an independent variable covering time 
to E-7 or any higher rank. The limitation exists due to the 
small number of minorities in the higher ranks for the 
specific cohorts used here. Since significance testing 
procedures must have a minimum number of observations to be 
reliable, and this minimum number is not available for ranks 
E-7 and up, statistical results would not be reliable. They 
would probably be biased and possibly lead to 
misinterpretations. 
AFQT score is considered an indication of trainability. 
Higher AFQT scores indicate that one will be able to succeed 
in a highly cognitive and demanding training program (Home, 
1987). A possible systematic difference for minorities in 
answering test questions that leads to biased results may 
exist. But, this research does examine these differences. Test 
theory is beyond the focus of this work and possible 
differences are considered random for all practical purposes. 
Education has been identified as an excellent indication 
of a person's ability to make it through the first term of 
service. In this sense, the variable is intended to measure 
"stick-to-itiveness." This thesis codes the variable 
"Education" as years of education completed. The reason is 
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that the author attempts to avoid issues concerning the 
equality of nontraditional educational programs compared with 
those of the regular system. Since time in school symbolizes 
first, the willingness and ability of a person to commit, and 
second indicates the level of education, this coding contains 
more information and is preferred to a list of different 
diplomas or degrees. 
To "catch" those who remained longer than average in 
school to achieve a specific educational level, a combination 
variable.is created that considers not only the highest grade 
but also age at the time of entry. One would expect someone 
with a lower level of schooling to be able to apply for 
employment earlier than someone with a longer education time. 
The length of the initial enlistment term may reflect a 
person's willingness to "commit" and/or the possible existence 
of personal career planning. On the other hand, an important 
decision about a longer period in the future of a young person 
may be done carelessly and without considering personal 
consequences. Also, initial enlistment term reflects the 
length of skill training - those with longer terms receive 
training in more skilled occupations. These effects need to be 
picked up by a model that tests and predicts success on the 
job. 
The "Age" variable gives information about the maturity 
of the applicant as he or she enters the Navy. An older 
applicant may have more life experience and may offer 
additional qualities of value to the military. Higher age may 
be related to being a better supervisor and/or having stronger 
leadership qualities. Of course, a person who is a lot older 
than the average applicant may seek to enter the military 
because he or she has not been able to initiate a career or at 
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least a professional future in the civilian labor market. In 
this case the individual might be a long-term unemployed or 
somebody with a history of many job changes. 
The "Gender" variable is important because women are a 
minority in the military. Furthermore, due to past legislative 
restrictions that prohibited women for serving in specific 
ratings (such as on combat ships), their chances of promotion 
have been different from those of men. This effect may even be 
extreme .for women who also belong to a racial or ethnic 
minority. 
Further, it is assumed that the family situation 
influences the performance of an enlisted member. That 
influence may be positive or negative, depending on how the 
family situation affects the individual's social and 
professional status. For example, being married with one or 
two children may indicate a person's willingness to take 
responsibilities, may show the ability to plan for the future 
(concerning job and family), and so on. At the same time, it 
may also indicate poor family planning. To be single is what 
one would expect from a 18-year-old person anyway. And, 
somebody with a large number of dependents may have trouble 
organizing his or her (private), life and also may have 
financial difficulties that would have a negative effect on 
job performance. Moonlighting is one example. 
Finally, the variables indicating the race and/or the 
ethnic origin of persons have to be created. Table II shows 
the variable names in the first column as well as the 
frequencies for specific cohorts. Some frequencies were not 
available because the coding of the original files changed 
after the year 1979. Those are denoted as NA (not available) 
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Table II Numbers of Navy Enlisted Personnel, by Minority- 
Status and Cohort Year 
Minority Cohort'79 Cohort'82 Cohort'85 
Black 11,827 10 ,496 12 ,640 
Hispanic 2,668 2 ,605 4 ,137 
Mexican 1,219 1 ,349 1 ,905 
Islander NA 847 1 ,557 
Puertorican 588 659 1 ,107 













Native Indian 79 223 287 
Latin American NA 157 265 

















Chinese 11 25 39 
Vietnamese NA 11 40 
Indian NA 17 23 
Micronesian NA 5 33 
Melanesian NA 27 5 
Eskimo 14 4 7 
Asian American 19 NA NA 
Aleut 5 0 2 
All Groups 18,761 17 ,820 24 ,357 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower 
Data Canter. 
in the table. Bold printed minority groups indicate the 
availability of data for all three cohorts. However, not all 
of those will be used in the empirical model, because some of 
these groups are so small that statistical testing is not 
possible with the necessary amount of reliability. 
In addition, the author had to change variable names to 
combine variables with the same meaning but different names 
(for example, "Hispanic" and "White Spanish" as well as "Other 
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Hispanic" and "Spanish"). Each pair stands for the same group 
of persons and differed only because of the new coding after 
1979. The newly-created variables "Hispanic" and "Spanish 
other" now account for members of these minorities throughout 
the three cohorts. 
D.  THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The basic model identifies individuals by their cohort. 
This may be important, first, to capture the misnorming effect 
of the 1979 cohort (which led to accessions who had AFQT test 
scores below the minimum level) and, second, to pinpoint the 
general difference of belonging to a different year group with 
a different work environment. The author recognizes that for 
the year 1979 there will not be a clear distinction between 
whether the misnorming incident or other time-related factors 
are causing possible differences in promotion opportunities. 
Both factors may offset each other or may work in the same 
direction. 
One's age at the time of entry into the Navy is limited 
to the range of 16 to 34 years. Observations with ages below 
16 are considered as coding errors, and persons entering with 
an age higher than. 34 are rare and possibly only due to 
exemptions, so that they are also excluded from the model. A 
variable that squares the age variable is used to enable the 
regression to identify diminishing returns for the oldest 
applicants. 
The gender variable "Sex" is coded 1 for a female sailor. 
The regression results then directly indicate the change in 
promotion time for women. One would expect to find it easier 
for women to compete in the more junior ranks, because at the 
beginning of their career they may find more "suitable" 
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ratings. And "suitable" means the more traditional jobs in 
which women work in the civilian world. Although more and more 
jobs have been opened for women than in the past, the so- 
called "glass ceiling" is more likely to be found in senior 
positions, since it takes a while until changes from the 
bottom work through the hierarchy. 
The "AFQT" variable reflects the percentile test scores 
attained by individuals on the Armed Forces Qualification 
Test. In the civilian labor market, one can find persons who 
are under- and overqualified. It is assumed that this is also 
true in the Armed Forces. An AFQT percentile score between 31 
and 49 (also described as AFQT Illb) is used as the base case. 
The variable "AFQT1" stands for everyone with a higher score; 
and the variable "AFQT4" captures a score range from 10 to 30 
(or, in other words, from AFQT IVc to AFQT IVa). 
In some instances, recruits get assigned a higher rank 
right away. One needs to remember that this is due to special 
programs, special skills, and other individual differences 
that are in high demand at the time. However, the higher 
initial rank is not due to prior service. Sailors with prior 
service are removed from the sample to keep the persons in the 
sample comparable. It remains to be seen whether special 
skills, prior training and/or highly-valued education that 
bring a higher initial rank can also assure faster promotion. 
It could also mean that those individuals are very competitive 
in the civilian labor market, that they are employed in a 
"niche," too small for the Navy to employ its own training, 
and therefore have a reduced chance for future promotions. 
The Delayed Entry Program (DEP) allows individuals to 
postpone their entry into active duty for up to one year 
(Kearl, Nelson, 1992) . Having been in the DEP may indicate 
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determination and planning for the future compared with a more 
instant idea of visiting the recruiting office right after 
graduation or in lieu of another civilian job. The DEP also 
gives recruits a chance to adjust to being in the military; 
and personnel attrition from the DEP sperates to "weed out" 
recruits who are likely to separate early from the active duty 
military. 
Table III Coding Key for the "Education" Variable 
Code 
Value 




Highest Year of 
Education 
1 Elementary (1-7) 7 College (1) 
2 Elementary (8) 8 College (2) 
3 High School (1) 9 College (3-4) 
4 High School (2) 10 College Grad. 
5 High School (3-4) 11 Masters Deg. 
6 High School Grad 12 Doctorate Deg. 
Table III illustrates the coding of the "Education" 
variable. The function of a squared variable in a regression 
model as a means to capture diminishing returns might also be 
useful for the "Education" variable and is therefore included 
in the final model. 
One needs to carefully analyze the correlations between 
single variables, when considering success indicators for an 
entry level position. The relatively high age of an applicant 
may make him or her a preferred choice due to more life 
experience. But if the same person can only provide a low- 
level of education, then one might ask what he or she has done 
during  all  these  years  (Buddin,  1984).  The  variable 
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"Determination squared" captures the relation of age and 
education level as an indicator for success. Again, the 
variable is used in its squared form to recognize diminishing 
returns. 
Recruits, to some degree and in accordance to training 
requirements, are allowed to choose the length of their first 
enlistment. Some may prefer a shorter obligation period than 
do others. And, this difference in action may also indicate 
differences in performance. Persons with an initial contract 
length of three years or less may not be as motivated as those 
with longer contracts; or, they may not be willing to take 
chances about their career. The so called "Short-Termers" may 
want to check out the employment conditions first, before 
taking longer obligations. This may be a wise move, or it may 
be more than appropriate carefulness. One should not forget 
that a good soldier has to weigh options and take risks for 
his or her personal well-being more than most other employees 
in the civilian world will ever have to do. In addition, 
longer obligations generally increase the cost of leaving, 
making a shorter first term more appealing (Mehay, 1994). 
As many sailors say, the Navy partially serves as a 
family substitute. The sailor in his or her young twenties 
often is single or married without children. But, nowadays, an 
increasing number of enlisted personnel have a family of their 
own or at least dependents. These two groups are compared by 
the model: the single or married person without children 
versus the single or married person with children. 
The next chapter discusses the statistical importance of 
all these variables discussed above and introduces the reader 
to the empirical results which may or may not coincide with 
the theoretical relationships for the different variables. 
26 
IV.  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter introduces the results of simple statistical 
procedures and regression models. The purpose of the simple 
statistical procedures is to provide further insight into the 
data. In addition, the results provide a first check for the 
correct specification of the regression models, and they may 
further identify the form of specific variables used in the 
regressions. 
The regression results are then discussed in two steps. 
First, the "Basic Models" are introduced and analyzed. With 
these models, the author analyzes the entire data set (the 
pooled 1979, 1982, and 1985 cohorts), at once, while 
controlling for any systematic differences related to 
specific cohorts using dummy variables. Second, to analyze how 
Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Programs have 
influenced promotion practices for the Navy's enlisted force, 
separate regression results are presented for each single 
cohort. 
Also in this chapter, the author acknowledges specific 
difficulties related to the data structure, the size of single 
ethnic/racial minorities, possible bias issues, and more. 
These difficulties are pointed out to identify areas for 
possible future improvements of the regression models. 
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A.  PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
1.  Simple Statistics 
a. Frequency Distributions 
Table IV depicts the fact that many enlisted 
personnel are in pay grades E-2 and E-3 at the time of their 
entry into the Navy. This supports using promotion to higher 
rank as the variable to be forecasted. Persons with an entry 
grade higher than E-3 have been eliminated from the sample as 
being atypical for the regular enlisted career. Considering 
the overall size of the individual cohorts, as well as their 
combined size, female enlisted personnel and those who are 
Table IV Number of New Enlisted Accessions by Cohort and 
Selected Variables 
Variable Cohort'79 Cohort' 82 Cohort'85 Total 
Male 66,480 68,437 71,874 206,701 
E-l 55,660 56,058 65,524 177,242 
E-2 3,841 2,905 3,751 10,497 




5,258 11,533 18,244 39,035 
All 75,002 76,254 81,486 232,742 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center. 
still serving are sizeable subgroups that need to be addressed 
in the analysis later in this thesis. 
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The number of personnel in an enlisted entry cohort 
decreases as time progresses. In addition, it can not be 
assumed that cohorts with more recent entry dates are similar 
in size, due to different force strength requirements. The 
implication for this work, then, is that one should not 
compare absolute numbers (i.e., the size of a particular 
subgroup), but size relative to the entire population in 
question. This size might not have been affected at all, and 
the proportion of the subgroup may be constant over time. This 
needs to be addressed further in the analysis. 
As Table V shows, the average entry age of enlisted 
personnel in the three cohorts is about 19.5 years. There was 
a slight increase over the three cohorts in question, as the 
average rose from 19.1 in the 1979 cohort to 19.7 in the more 
recent groups. The value of 6.5 for education (mean value for 
total sample) signifies an average above the level of a high 
school graduate with a diploma or corresponding General 
Educational Development (GED) equivalency certificate (which 
would be 6.0). This fact may not be surprising, since high 
school graduates are the target of recruiters. The extreme 
values of the variable "Highest Year of Education" become more 
important for the actual regression analysis. 
Looking at the numbers for the average time in 
service (TINSVC) in months, it becomes obvious that the 1985 
cohort differs from the others. The average number of months 
someone serves is down from almost 46 in 1979 to 38.5 for the 
19 85 group. But, one needs to be careful in interpreting this 
discrepancy. The difference may result from shorter contracts. 
It may also result from the fact that the 1985 cohort has had 
only eight years of service, since the dataset is updated only 
through the year 1992. So, one would expect the average time 
in service to increase further as time progresses. The same 
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Table V Number of Occurrences, Mean Values, and Standard 
Deviations for Selected Variables by Cohorts 
Variable Cohort N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
TT0E4 pooled 129,728 24.4 14.0 
1979 41,725 24.4 13.7 
1982 41,560 24.9 15.0 
1985 46,443 23.9 13.3 
TT0E5 pooled 78,134 46.5 20.3 
1979 25,997 46.8 23.7 
1982 26,956 47.4 20.6 
1985 25,181 45.4 15.5 
TT0E6 pooled 27,691 85.7 23.1 
1979 12,835 90.5 26.7 
1982 10,527 85.2 19.8 
1985 4,329 72.5 10.9 
Entry Age pooled 232,742 19.5 2.5 
1979 75,002 19.1 2.1 
1982 76,254 19.7 2.4 
1985 81,486 19.7 2.6 
APQT pooled 232,742 55.3 22.2 
Score 1979 75,002 51.7 23.7 
1982 76,254 56.0 21.6 
1985 81,486 58.0 20.7 
TINSVC pooled 93,707 43.2 28.7 
1979 65,744 45.9 33.0 
1982 64,721 45.0 28.7 
1985 63,242 38.5 22.8 
Education pooled 232,742 6.5 2.1 
1979 75,002 6.2 2.0 
1982 76,254 6.7 2.4 
1985 81,486 6.4 1.7 






Time in service to promotion to E-4 
Time in service to promotion to E-5 
Time in service to promotion to E-6 
Time in service 
(all in months) 
argument holds for the 1982 cohort, which in 1992 is in its 
11th year of being tracked. Since the three cohorts are in 
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different stages of maturity, one needs to be especially aware 
of the most recent cohort's limitations. Since it takes about 
seven years for a person to become an E-6, it would not be 
appropriate to model promotion to E-7 or higher, because 
members of the 1985 cohort are not yet eligible (in these 
data) for promotion to E-7 or higher, yet. 
A person's level of education and AFQT score are 
indicators of one's qualifications to serve in the Navy. For 
the cohort groups, it can be seen in Table V that the average 
AFQT score increased from 51 to 58, and the standard deviation 
decreased. This means the Navy has been able to not only 
increase the quality of its personnel, on average, but also on 
the individual level. The variance of possible outcomes for 
the AFQT scores has narrowed considerably. It should also be 
noted that these scores have been corrected for the 1979 
cohort to account for the AFQT misnorming. This might explain 
why the difference for the mean values and the standard 
deviations is so much larger for the 1979 cohort when compared 
with the other groups. 
There is one overall trend concerning promotion to 
E-4, E-5, and E-6, as seen in Table V. Members of the 1985 
cohort have been promoted considerably faster to each of these 
grades. The average time over all three cohorts for promotion 
to E-4 is 24 months, which coincides with the requirement of 
two years of service. The average time-in-service to Petty 
Officer Second Class (E-5) for these three cohorts is about 
ten months longer than the legal requirement of three years. 
And, for promotions to Petty Officer First Class (E-6), the 
average time again equals the requirement of seven years. 
One needs to be careful in interpreting these data 
for the purpose of an analysis of promotion practices. The 
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above-mentioned mean times to promotion only account for those 
who made the cut, those who were promoted at all. Excluding 
everyone else would truncate the dataset considerably and 
would mean a preselection of a sample out of the entire 
population based on the underlying success factor "promotion 
to the rank in question." 
Some argue that, because of this potential bias, 
only a "survival model" that evaluates the odds of surviving 
the system to specific points in time or promotions would be 
the correct form because it takes account of the entire 
population (Gilroy, Home, and Smith, 1991) . On the other 
hand, survival models are not able to distinguish between the 
more successful sailor who got promoted faster and the less 
successful one who just made it to the next higher rank. 
Therefore, the author believes that not considering different 
times-in-service to promotion will take away valuable 
information from the analysis. 
The goal should be to minimize bias (i.e., to 
minimize excluded personnel from the database). This is 
accomplished by including within the model those who left the 
system, because they missed promotion just before reaching the 
rank in question. For example, persons who left the Navy as an 
E-3 are assigned a projected promotion time to E-4 that equals 
the total time in service. The author recognizes that these 
values are optimistic in nature, since not everybody would 
have been promoted on the day following the termination of 
service. Nevertheless, this projection should be closer to 
reality than excluding about 40 percent of the observations 
for promotion to E-4. 
Second, by analyzing different models for different 
ranks, one leaves the possibility open that there might be 
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systematic differences between personnel, depending on when 
they left the system. More clearly, as appealing as it might 
be to avoid selection bias by modeling the entire population 
for, say, promotion to E-6, the model would not account for 
the fact that some enlistees may not want to be a Master Chief 
Petty Officer. And, further, it would not be appropriate to 
select identical promotion criteria for a recruit who wants 
to stay in the Navy for only four years. Therefore, and since 
there is no other motivation measure, it appears more 
appropriate to analyze persons who made it to a specific rank 
and those who theoretically would have been eligible to be 
promoted. 
b.     Time-in-service Comparisons 
Figures 1 and 2 show the representation of two 
minority groups -- blacks and Mexican-Americans, respectively 
-- by cohort over time. There are some patterns that emerge: 
for blacks, the trend is increased representation over time. 
For all three cohorts, this may suggest that blacks are 
relatively successful in the Navy, on average. Again, this 
does not have to be the case. Indeed, without more 
information, one can only conclude that proportionately more 
blacks decide to stay in the Navy, given they are eligible to 
reenlist. Whether they are the more "successful" sailors would 
have to be evaluated by other means. 
Although the above-mentioned arguments are the same 
for Mexican-Americans, the trend is different. The number of 
Mexican-American recruits increased over time. As seen in 
Figure 2, the proportion within the 1982 and 1985 cohorts does 
not change significantly (both cohorts have a slightly 
increased participation of Mexican-Americans by one tenth of 
a percent); and, within the 1985 cohort, Mexican-American 
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Figure 1 Blacks as a proportion of Navy Enlisted Personnel by 
Cohort Over Time (Months in service) 
Legend 
 Cohort 79 
Cohort 82 
    Cohort 85 
60.0 72.0 
Tlme-ln-Service In Months 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center. 
participation drops by 50 percent in eight years (96 months) . 
Figures 1 and 2 show quite different patterns and their 
interpretation needs to emphasize the need for separate 
analyses of different ethnic groups as long as sufficient 
numbers of data are available for any racial/ethnic minority. 
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Figure 2 Mexican-Americans as a Proportion of Navy Enlisted 
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2.  Discussion 
The simple statistics reveal important additional 
justification in the structure of the data. They provide 
further reasons for the specification of the final regression 
models. The regression models appear in detail in Appendix C. 
The first six models are discussed below. 
First, the different cohorts, different promotion levels, 
and different ethnic and/or racial groups have to be treated 
separately, as previously explained. The cohort and minority 
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group identification are important explanatory variables 
within the models. The different promotion levels call for 
separate models. Three models are specified without 
distinguishing between different groups of racial or ethnic 
minorities. This is done because these models provide 
generalized results that can serve as a basis for comparing 
how well a specific minority group performed with respect to 
racial and/or ethnic minorities as a whole. 
All other explanatory variables are thought to be 
determinants of one's productivity on the job. The importance 
of the variables have been discussed in previous chapters. 
This variable set enables the statistician to compare two 
persons or two groups of persons who are identical in all but 
one of the selected characteristics. This is one of the most 
important reasons why the multiple regression method is 
preferred to other statistical methods when analyzing possible 
differences in promotion for minorities. 
B.  RESULTS OP MULTIVARIATE MODELS 
1.  The Estimated Coefficients 
The partial regression coefficients (or parameter 
estimates,) in Tables VI and VII express the change in the 
dependent variable for a one-unit change in one of the 
explanatory variables. Both changes are changes in the mean 
values, so they are not necessarily true for any given 
individual. All other variables are held constant or, as one 
may say, are controlled for (Gujarati, 1988, p. 169). These 
conditions prevail for all models used in the study. 
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Table VI Parameter Estimates for the Regression Models 
with Pooled Data, by Selected Variable 
Variables Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
R-square 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.22 0.42 0.18 
Dependent Variable TTOE4 TTOES TTOE6 TTOE4 TTOE5 TTOE6 
Fiscal 1979 0.4 -2.1 13.5 0.3 -2.1 13.5 
Fiscal 1982 2.1 -0.7 9.8 2.1 -0.6 9.9 
Entry Age (squared) / 100 0.5 -1.4 -0.4 0.5 -1.3 -0.3 
Gender 0.3 0.8 3.2 0.4 0.8 3.2 
AFQT 1 -4.6 -2.0 -2.2 -4.6 -2.0 -2.3 
AFQT 4 1.9 3.7 3.5 1.9 3.7 3.6 
DEP -1.3 <L2 -0.6 -1.4 0.0 -0.6 
Entry Grade -6.3 2.0 -1.0 -6.2 2.0 -1.0 
Education -3.8 -1.7 -2.7 -3.8 -1.7 -2.6 
Education (squared) 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Determination 
(squared) / 100 
-0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 <Li 
Short Obligation -1.0 1.5 M -1.0 1.5 <LZ 
Single -1.8 0J. -0.5 -1.8 <Li -0.5 
Married -2.4 -1.2 1.7 -2.4 -1.2 1.7 
TTOE4 0.9 -0.2 0.9 -0.2 
TTOE5 0.4 0.4 
Minority 2.3 2.6 5.8 
Black 2.7 3.0 6.8 
Hispanic 1.1 06 L9 
Other Hispanic 0J 1.7 -0.0 
Mexican-American QA 1.1 0.5 
Puerto Rican 1.7 1.7 2.5 
Philippine 02 4.0 11.6 
Native Indian 2.8 -1.7 -3.4 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Note: Underlined regression coefficients are not significant at a 10 percent level. Intercept is omitted from table. 
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Thus, for example, a coefficient of 2.3 (or -2.3) means that, 
holding all other variables constant, an increase in the mean 
value per unit leads to a 2.3 months longer (or shorter) time 
in service to promotion. 
a. An Interpretation and Comparison 
The parameter estimates for the 1979 and 1985 dummy 
variables are positive for promotion to E-4, negative and 
again positive, respectively, for E-5 and E-6 promotions. 
These alternating advantages and disadvantages are partially 
due to the hierarchical manpower system in the Navy that 
promotes to fill vacancies. After a year with plenty of 
vacancies for a preceding cohort, it will take longer for 
personnel from following cohorts to get promoted. This is 
because vacancies will be less frequent for members of the 
following cohorts due to the time-in-rank minimum requirements 
for the next promotion of the incumbent. Also, but less 
obviously, differences for members of different cohorts may be 
due to the changed treatment of minorities over time. The 
answer to the question, "Over time, how did Equal Opportunity 
work for the promotion of racial/ethnic minorities in the 
Navy?," cannot be answered from these models because the 
models do not filter out the required information. To do this, 
separate regression models must be run for each separate 
cohort. (These results are attached in Appendix C, following 
model 6.) A tabular summary as well as a discussion of these 
models is presented at the end of this chapter. 
For the basic models (displayed in Table VI) the 
variable entry age (squared) shows diminishing returns for 
promotion to E-4. The uhsquared age could not be included as 
a variable in the model, since severe colinearity problems 
would  have  occurred  together  with  the  "Determination 
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(squared)" variable. However, the variable "Age squared" 
indicates that the entry age by itself may have no influence 
on later performance. 
For women (the "Gender" variable measures 
differential promotion times for women), all six models show 
positive values for the "Gender" coefficients. Female sailors 
generally are promoted slower than their male counterparts, 
and the differences increase for promotion to higher pay 
grades. For E-4 promotion, the difference is smaller: on 
average, it takes women about two weeks longer than men to 
reach the grade. The difference increases to three weeks to 
promotion to E-5 and three months to promotion to E-6. 
The regression models also suggest sailors with the 
highest AFQT score (Category I) are promoted quicker, on 
average, than those who score around the mean. And sailors 
with low scores on the test are promoted at the slowest rate. 
The range is largest for E-4 promotion. It seems that a 
person's score on the AFQT may be a good screening device. The 
data also suggest that there are other determinants at work 
with respect to promotion. 
The data show that joining the Navy through the DEP 
is only an advantage for promotion to E-4. However, it appears 
that more life experience and a possibly greater interest in 
the Navy at the very beginning of one's service are not of 
permanent influence. During training and education, the level 
of life experience equals out. Further into the career, 
initial motivation may fade for some as others develop 
intrinsic reasons for staying in the Navy. 
Persons who enter the Navy in grade E-2, and even 
more so for E-3, save about six or 12 months, respectively, on 
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the way to E-4. This is probably a systematic difference in 
treatment during the first term of enlistment. On the other 
hand, as Table VI shows, promotion to E-5 takes persons with 
entry grades E-2 and E-3 two and four months longer, 
respectively; and for promotion tö E-6, again, both groups 
have a small advantage of one and two months, respectively. 
Obviously, this group competes on level ground from the second 
term on. And, there might be some skills that help them in 
their career. One might think about the earlier opportunities 
to use leadership skills in supervisory tasks. 
The education variable is a good example of 
diminishing returns for increased number of years in school. 
Although the unsquared variable indicates two to four months 
less time in service to promotion, the squared variable has a 
negative sign, and thereby partially offsets the above- 
mentioned advantage. For example, from model one: persons with 
five years of schooling are promoted about four months faster 
than those with six years of education. This is counteracted 
by two additional months, resulting from the difference of 
five squared to six square multiplied with the parameter 
estimate for the squared schooling variable (0.204) . This also 
means a decreased chance of earlier promotion for a person 
with eight or more years of schooling. 
As seen in Table VI, the difference between three or 
four years of high school education on the one hand, and high 
school graduation with a diploma, on the other hand, can be 
expressed as an advantage of two months in promotion time to 
E-4. For persons with two years or more of college education, 
the diminishing returns are larger than the added benefit of 
the additional education. 
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The squared determination variable subtracts the 
years of education from the age of a recruit to measure the 
efficiency with which someone obtained his or her education. 
The variable picks up persons with an unusually high age for 
a lower level of education. Unfortunately, the variable cannot 
determine whether someone was employed or not, or whether the 
discrepancy is due to repeated grades. Then, the 
interpretation is that, with an increased difference between 
age and education, independent of what someone might have done 
during this time span, the likelihood of promotion to E-4 
increases. At the same time, promotion time to E-5 and E-6 
decreases. A straight-forward education, then, seems to 
decrease promotion time for career personnel. 
The length of a person's initial term of enlistment 
is also found to offset time to promotion. A three-year (or 
less) term of enlistment reduces promotion time to E-4, but it 
increases time to E-5. Initially, the author thought that a 
shorter enlistment term gave the individual a chance to "check 
out" the system; it now appears more likely that the system 
rewards those who indicate an early willingness to stay for a 
longer time period. This makes sense from an economic point of 
view. Since training costs need to be recouped during "pay- 
back" tours, the short-termer will not get the same amount of 
training right away. After deciding to reenlist and get more 
training, these persons will still have a relative 
disadvantage since their career path has not been as straight- 
forward as those who made a longer-term commitment at the 
start. 
Sailors who have dependents generally find faster 
promotion to E-4. This may reflect the possibly greater sense 
of responsibility among these recruits toward their family, 
but it may also show that there are facilities in place that 
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allow single parents to be successful on the job despite the 
fact that they have to care for dependents. Further into the 
career, the results become inconclusive for singles, while the 
coefficients for married persons with children have the 
opposite sign. For promotion to E-6, the average married 
father or mother will need more time according to the model. 
One's family may be seen to distract from service duties or 
limit one's options later in the career. 
The models include the time in service it took a 
sailor to get promoted to E-4 when modeling time in service to 
E-5, and time-in-service to promotion to E-4 and E-5 as well, 
when modeling promotion to E-6. The time it took to reach a 
previous rank seems to be positively related to the promotion 
time of the current rank. For example, model 2 shows that 
every additional month for promotion to E-4 will result in 
nearly an additional month until the next promotion. This 
negative effect turns positive, when looking one level 
further. An increased time until promotion to E-4 will result 
in a faster promotion to E-6, while a longer time to be 
promoted to E-5 apparently slows one's promotion opportunities 
to E-6. 
Minorities, in general, are promoted slower than 
their non-minority counterparts. For example, models 4 through 
6 show that it takes minority members from two to six months 
longer to get promoted, all other factors being the same. 
Evaluated at the mean, a minority takes about 10 percent 
longer to get promoted to E-4, seven percent longer to E-5, 
and seven percent longer to E-6. Broken down into the selected 
seven minority groups of the first three models, only Native 
Indians are promoted faster than the majority to E-5 and E-6. 
But, the values are not significant at the 10 percent level, 
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due to the small numbers of Native Americans within the 
cohorts. 
The statistical results for the models that are 
using the minority dummy variable are presented in Appendix C. 
Models 7 through 15, in Tables VII and VIII specifically 
evaluate differences in promotion times for minorities in 
general. (Models 7 through 9 cover time-in-service to E-4; 
models 10 to 12 do the same for E-5; and model 13 through 15 
use time-in-service to E-6 as the dependent variable.) Models 
16 through 24, in Tables VIII and IX are organized in the same 
fashion. The difference is that they evaluate promotion times 
for specific minorities (i.e., blacks, Hispanic-Americans, 
Mexican-Americans, all other Americans with Hispanic origin, 
Puerto Ricans, Filipino-Americans, and Native Americans). 
On average, it takes a member of the 1979 cohort who 
is a racial or ethnic minority seven weeks longer for 
promotion to rank E-4 than someone from the majority. The 
differential increases for the 1982 and 1985 cohorts which 
differs from the expectation that these numbers should be 
decreasing if equal opportunity programs are effective. For 
someone from the latter-named two cohorts it takes an 
additional nine or ten weeks, respectively, to make E-4, 
should he or she belong to a racial or ethnic minority. 
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Table VII Regression Results for Time-in-Service to Promotion 
to E-4, E-5, and E-6 Models for Each Cohort, by Selected 
Variable 


















R-square 0.22 0.25 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.13 
Dependent 
Variable 
TTOE4 TTOE4 TTOE4 TTOE5 TTOE5 TTOE5 
Entry age 
(squared) / 100 
<M -0.08 1.7 1.4 -0.6 0.04 
Gender -2.5 -0.3 3.1 -1.1 2.4 5.0 
AFQT1 -2.8 -3.7 -6.7 -5.3 -6.9 -7.4 
AFQT4 2.1 2.2 2.2 -5.8 7.0 3.8 
Entrygrade -6.6 -7.2 -5.2 -5.4 -4.3 -1.5 
Education -4.4 -2.1 -5.3 -6.9 -3.8 -5.2 
Education 
(squared) 
0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 
Determination 
(squared) / 100 
-0.9 -0.2 -2.8 -2.7 -0.1 -0.1 
Short Obligation -1.7 <Li M 3.3 1.1 -0.4 
Single -0.2 -1.0 -2.6 2.6 -0.6 -2.0 
Married -1.6 -2.4 -2.4 -2.9 -2.7 -2.6 
Minority 1.7 2.3 2.5 3.6 5.1 4.0 
Source: Derived from Data provided by the Defense Manpower Date Center. 
Note: Underlined regression coefficients are not significant at a 10 percent level. Intercept is omitted from table. 
44 
Table VIII Regression Results for Each of the Three Cohorts 
(Continued from Table VII), by Selected Variable 


















R-square 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.22 0.25 0.21 
Dependent 
Variable 
TTOE6 TTOE6 TTOE6 TTOE4 TTOE4 TTOE4 
Entry age 
(squared) / 100 
-3.0 -0.3 -0.3 M -0.06 1.7 
Gender 2.6 5.0 2.6 -2.5 -0.3 3.1 
AFQT1 -5.2 -4.4 1.7 -2.8 -3.7 -6.7 
AFQT4 5.8 2.4 -1.7 2.1 2.1 2.2 
Entrygrade -2.9 -1.1 0.8 -6.6 -7.3 -5.3 
Education -3.9 -4.7 hi -4.4 -2.2 -5.3 
Education 
(squared) 
0.3 0.2 -0.0 0.2 QA 0.3 
Determination 
(squared) / 100 
5.0 0J 3.6 -0.8 -0.2 -2.7 
Short 
Obligation 
L9 -3.0 M -1.7 0.1 0.4 
Single 12. -1.6 1.8 -0.3 -1.1 -2.7 
Married -1.7 1.6 -0.1 -1.6 -2.4 -2.4 
Minority 9.0 6.8 1.8 
Black 2.2 2.7 2.8 
Hispanic 0.4 M 2.3 
Other 
Hispanic 
-0.2 U. -0.9 
Mexican- 
American 
-0.0 <L2 -0.1 
Puerto Rican <L2 L2 L° 
Philippine -1.7 -0.3 1.2 
Native Indian 4.5 3.2 1.9 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Note: Underlined regression coefficient« are not significant at a 10 percent level. Intercept is omitted from table. 
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So far, the interpretation for the "minority" 
variable was based on highly significant values (at the 10 
percent level) and would have been significant even far below 
the selected alpha value (significance level). Since the 
Navy's Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action programs 
concerning race and ethnic origin (versus gender) refer to 
racial and/or ethnic minorities as a whole, the above- 
mentioned results can be interpreted as providing a 
generalized answer to the research question. Still, it is 
interesting to see how fast particular racial/ethnic 
minorities have been promoted over the years based on their 
entry cohort. 
First, it should be noted that not all of the 
results for the different regression runs are significant. In 
the following discussion, the author includes only results 
that are significant at the 10-percent level. All data for 
blacks are highly significant, which is not surprising as they 
are the largest minority subgroup (see Table II) . As a result, 
the promotion times for blacks contribute heavily to the 
results of the "Minority" variable. Further, the coefficients 
of the "Black" variable follow the same patterns as the ones 
for the "Minority" variable; so, the same interpretations as 
above hold. The reader may view model 16 and following ones 
(see Tables VIII and IX) . The actual values for additional 
promotion times"vary only slightly. Exceptions to the "rule" 
are as follows. With respect to E-4, Native Indians experience 
a relatively faster time to promotion for each of the three 
cohorts, going from three months to two months to one month. 
This result contradicts the general findings from above. 
Filipino-Americans were promoted to E-5 faster in 
the 19 82 cohort (4.4 months) than in the 1979 cohort (4.8 
months); but, they then slipped back to 5 months for the most 
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Table IX Regression Results for Each of the Three Cohorts 
(Continued from Table VII and VIII), by Selected Variable 


















R-square 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.01 
Dependent 
Variable 
TTOE5 TTOE5 TTOE5 TTOE6 TTOE6 TTOE6 
Entry age 
(squared)/ 100 
1.4 -0.6 0.04 -3.0 -0.4 -2.7 
Gender -1.1 2.4 5.0 2.6 5.0 2.6 
AFQT1 -5.3 -6.9 -7.3 -5.2 -4.4 1.9 
AFQT4 5.7 7.1 3.9 5.6 2.4 -1.6 
Entrygrade -5.4 -4.3 -1.6 -2.9 -1.0 0.8 
Education -7.0 -3.8 -5.1 ^.1 ^.8 LI 
Education 
(squared) 
0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.0 
Determination 
(squared) / 100 
-2.7 -0.1 -1.0 4.6 M 3.6 
Short 
Obligation 
3.2 L9 -0.4 <LZ -3.2 hi 
Single hi -0.7 -2.0 hi -1.6 1.9 
Married -2.8 -2.7 -2.6 -1.6 1.7 -0.0 
Black 4.2 5.5 4.3 10.1 7.6 2.3 
Hkpanir hi LI IA 2.2 10.2 2.4 
Other 
Hispanic 
hi hi <LZ 7.5 -9.2 -3.6 
Mexican- 
American 
«LI hi hi hi -8.0 -2.9 
Puerto Rican 2.9 hi hi 6.2 -7.0 -0.0 
Philippine 4.8 4.4 5.0 19.1 10.2 8.3 
Native Indian ^.5 M <L6 -6.0 0.3 -7.0 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Note: Underlined regression coefficients are not significant at a 10 percent level. Intercept is omitted from table. 
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recent cohort. This particular minority is the sixth largest 
racial/ethnic group, and these results imply that the parity 
has not been achieved in promotion to E-5 for this group. 
With respect to E-6, Filipino-Americans exhibited a 
slower promotion time by a whopping 19 months in the 1979 
cohort (which may be related to a specific personnel 
management policy and /or occupational placements). This is 
the highest number in all regression models concerning 
additional time-in-service of any racial/ethnic minority 
awaiting promotion to any of the examined ranks. The 
differential in time to promotion declines in the 1982 and 
1985 cohorts by 10 and eight months, respectively. This, then, 
is still a difference of about three-quarters of a year on 
average. 
Next, the significance of the different coefficients is 
discussed, before some conclusions are drawn from the 
promotion numbers for minorities. 
b.     The Significance of the Coefficients 
Most coefficients are highly significant at the 10 
percent level. There are certain notable exemptions here, such 
as Native Americans (mentioned above). For these and other 
special cases (the underlined values for the parameter 
estimates in Table VI), above discussed relationships cannot 
be relied on. 
Starting with model 4, the interested reader may 
view the values in the column "Prob > |T|" (Appendix C gives 
the actual values), which inform about the statistical 
significance of the results. All variables for model 4 are 
significant at the 10 percent level. As one runs model 5 (time 
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in service to E-5, which occurs later during the career) DEP 
membership as well as being single with dependents lose their 
unambiguous influence on promotion. At the E-6 level, age, 
determination, and duration of the first term no longer hold 
explanatory value since they, too, are no longer significant 
at the required level. 
The adjusted R-squares (as shown in Appendix C) are 
measures that filter out the fact that an increased number of 
explanatory variables in most cases will increase the R- square 
value, thereby artificially improving the goodness-of-fit of 
the model. Since the difference between the R-squared values 
and the corresponding adjusted R-squared value still is very 
small, and using the same set of variables makes comparisons 
easier, these nonsignificant variables are not taken out of 
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the final models 1 through 6. However, for the remaining 
models, the DEP variable had to be excluded, since the 
coefficients turn into constants for this variable. Further 
meaning of the R-square values are explained below. 
C.  MODEL CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Validity 
Validity characterizes the degree of confidence in the 
model's inferences with the real world or, in other words, 
that the model's results conform to reality. One indicator for 
the degree of validity is the R-squared value shown at the top 
of each printout in Appendix C. Another expression for R- 
square is "Multiple coefficient of determination," meaning the 
proportion of the variation in the dependent variable that can 
be explained by variation in the explanatory variables. 
The R-squared values range from 18 to 42 percent for the 
six basic models, and indicate a high degree of validity, 
given the database consists of pooled data, which is a 
combination of time series and cross sectional data. Even more 
important may be that the original model's (model 4) 
coefficients are all significant at the 10 percent level, 
which in itself stands for a high level of validity for the 
model. 
2. Relevancy 
Whether the model is relevant is the question of whether 
it addresses directly the issue at hand. Looking back, the 
model with its subsets can be utilized to analyze the 1979, 
1982, and 1985 Navy enlisted personnel cohort data. At the 
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same time, it is a powerful tool that has the qualities to 
predict performance as measured by the time to promotion to E- 
4, E-5, and E-6. Also, it shows the differential impact of 
racial/ethnic background on performance while controlling for 
other sociodemographic variables. In summary, the model meets 
the first set of research objectives, as stated in Chapter I. 
3.  Problem Areas 
a. The Unknown 
Smith, Sylwester, and Villa (in Gilroy, Home, and 
Smith, 1991) do not find indications for discrimination based 
on the racial/ethnic status of U.S. Army personnel. Their 
study looks at cohort data from 1977 to 1984, divided into 
three equal-sized groups. Although they control for the fiscal 
year of accession, minority status, gender, number of 
dependents, years of education, AFQT score, prior service, and 
occupation, their model does not reveal inequalities in 
promotion time for minorities. 
The difference in the findings between Smith, et al. 
and this thesis may be due to several factors. First, their 
database is different -- namely, the Army instead the Navy. 
Second, they predict the values for each explanatory variable 
for those who separated before one or two ranks below the one 
in question for modeling promotion time (assuming specific 
distributions for each variable). And, third, their set of 
explanatory variables (model specification) differs from this 
thesis. 
It may not be possible to pinpoint all reasons for 
the different findings. However, the search for possible 
reasons helps to illuminate some common problems for this type 
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of analysis: it may very well be that there are systematic 
differences between the way the Army and the Navy handle 
promotions. However, the Smith, Sylwester, and Villa model can 
only be as good as its prediction for all the variable values 
of personnel who separated before promotion (80 percent of all 
variable values for promotion to E-6 are predicted and weigh 
that much more in the actual regression compared to actual 
data). Whether the assumptions used to create specifically- 
shaped distributions for those values are correct, remains to 
be proven. 
Finally, this thesis chooses a richer set of 
explanatory variables then most other methods used to model 
promotion times. This difference may be responsible for 
different outcomes. And, although a (statistical) model should 
always be as simple as possible, there is no guarantee that 
the variable set is the one that simulates the real world 
best, or that important explanatory variables have not been 
omitted. 
b.    Data. Issues 
Including prior service members in the model may 
lead to bias. As Smith, Sylwester, and Villa (in Gilroy, 
Home, and Smith, 1991) recognize: 
Prior-service soldiers have faster promotion times 
to grades E-5 and E-6. There are two related explanations 
for this result. First, prior-service soldiers typically 
return to the Army at a lower grade than their grade at 
separation and, therefore, have already demonstrated the 
skills required for that grade. Second, given_ the 
financial cost associated with an interrupted military 
career, it is likely that prior-service soldiers may be 
more motivated than the average soldier (Gilroy, Home, 
and Smith,1991,p. 141). 
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This statement may not be the only interpretation of 
the underlying statistical results. Gilroy, Home, and Smith 
also could have concluded that there are problems with the 
chosen database. It may also be problematic that entry grades 
from E-4 and higher do not seem to be excluded from the 
database. Based on the reasons developed in the methodology, 
this thesis pursued a different strategy by eliminating these 
questionable data. 
c. Small Samples 
The overall sample size never created a problem for 
this analysis. However, the small numbers for some 
racial/ethnic minorities at accession (and further reduction 
in their numbers over time) may have created a problem. Only 
the variables for blacks and racial/ethnic minorities as a 
whole yielded reliable and highly significant results. For 
the other racial/ethnic groups in the model not all results 
were conclusive. 
d. Biases 
This thesis as well as the work of Smith, Sylwester, 
and Villa (in Gilroy, Home, and Smith, 1991) both control for 
different accession years. As stated elsewhere: 
The fiscal year of accession variables are included 
to measure any differences in promotion times due to 
macro factors, such as changes in the manpower 
requirements at each grade, deceleration of promotions in 
response to budget pressure, or differences in accession 
cohort size (Gilroy,  Home, and Smith, 1991, p. 141) . 
The difference in methodology is that this thesis, 
in a second step, analyzes the data for each cohort 
separately. The author believes this is necessary to identify 
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possibly discriminatory behavior that may have systematically 
varied over time. Those differences (as they are observed with 
the help of models 7 through 24) are not observed in the model 
used by Smith, Sylwester, and Villa, because that portion of 
discrimination will be attributed to fiscal year differences. 
One additional, undetected bias may lie in the 
treatment of different occupations and/or occupational groups 
as explanatory variables. Most authors agree that one should 
control for differences in promotion time based on occupation, 
since promotion in the Navy is based on vacancies by 
occupation. This is a commonly accepted argument since it is 
known that self-selection leads to nonrepresentative 
distributions of minorities across occupations. However, 
selecting each rating as a dummy variable is not realistic 
considering the small size of some minority groups, so pooling 
of occupations is often undertaken. This creates another 
problem, because pooling of several occupational specialties 
(as well as the ensuing results) may then be arbitrary. Also, 
the influence of specific ratings on promotion time may not be 
the same over time and may be different depending on the 
enlisted rank. In addition, affirmative action programs more 
and more have targeted equal representation in the 
distribution of racial/ethnic groups across occupational 
specialties (Barnhill, 1991). All of these reasons convinced 
the author to select time-in-service to the two preceding 
grades of the one in question. This variable picks up 
systematic differences due to many factors, including 
occupational specialty, and allows for differences depending 
on rank simultaneously. 
The next chapter summarizes the above discussed results 
and draws conclusions from the statistics. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.  SUMMARY 
Projections of the racial/ethnic distribution of the 
nation's youth through the year 2000 indicate an increased 
share of minorities eligible for enlistment in one of the 
military services (Eitelberg and Mehay, 1994). An effective 
military has to have manpower development policies in place 
that ensure equal opportunities for racial/ethnic minorities. 
This thesis offers an example of how multiple regression 
analysis can be used to monitor fairness in promotion 
practices and policies. The literature review focused on the 
development of the most useful research methodology for this 
thesis (which was found to be multiple regression analysis) as 
well as possible model specifications. The final empirical 
models were discussed in Chapter III, followed by the 
presentation of the statistical results. 
The regression results of this thesis suggest that the 
racial/ethnic status of a Navy enlisted person accounts for a 
statistically significant difference in promotion time. Or, as 
Butler (1976) concludes for the data he analyzed: there is 
seemingly unequal treatment of racial groups concerning 
promotion times. 
An enlisted person belonging to a racial/ethnic minority, 
on average, is promoted to either E-4, E-5, or E-6 (all other 
variables held constant) at a slower rate than members of the 
majority. Using multiple regression analysis, instead of 
Butler's (1976) cross-tabulation methodology, the findings in 
this thesis still tend to replicate his results : "Little 
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support is given . . . for the argument that racial inequality- 
is to be explained by the failure ... to meet 
universalistic criteria". 
Further, this thesis analyzed promotion times to E-4, E- 
5, and E-6 for seven specific minorities. The results for 
blacks are most reliable, due to the consistently high number 
of blacks for any of the three cohorts and the three ranks in 
question. Black sailors tend to have slower times to promotion 
to the ranks examined here which coincides with the findings 
for racial/ethnic minorities in general (since blacks are the 
largest minority group). The results for the other six 
racial/ethnic minorities are not always reliable, and in some 
instances show opposite results (higher performance and 
earlier promotion, such as for Native Indians). 
The control variables for the cohort's fiscal year, 
gender, AFQT group, entry grade, education, education squared, 
married, time to the two previous ranks are highly significant 
in the six basic models. Fiscal 1979 and 1982 cohort members 
are promoted faster to E-4, slower to E-5, and faster to E-6. 
Women, on average, are promoted at slower rates to any of 
these three grades (longest to E-6). A high AFQT score speeds 
up promotion, whereas low AFQT scores slow promotion 
(especially to higher grades) . Together, the education and the 
education squared variables show the value of obtaining a 
higher level of education and diminishing returns to 
education. A married person with children seems to perform 
better in the more junior ranks but worse in the more senior 
ones. The time it takes to get promoted to E-4 seems to be 
positively related to time to promotion to E-5, but negatively 
related to time-to-promotion to E-6. 
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B.  STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF STUDY AND MODEL 
One limitation of this study is the small numbers of 
racial/ethnic minority members, especially in the higher 
ranks. This is the reason that the multiple regression 
analysis often shows insignificant regression coefficients. 
Also, choosing the cohort 1985 and analyzing promotion to E-6 
may have truncated the data base, since there may be more 
persons in the 1985 cohort who, in 1992, are still waiting and 
eligible for promotion to E-6. This problem poses a dilemma: 
one either cannot analyze more recent cohort data or is 
limited to the more junior ranks. One way to overcome this 
limitation would be to update the database (the data used here 
follow the cohort through 1992) to include 1993 and 1994 data. 
Further research should account for possible systematic 
differences relating to the occupation of a person. Time in 
the two previous ranks works as an approximation for these 
occupational differences; but, the author acknowledges that 
one should also conduct different analyses for each occupation 
or occupational group. Again, such research would probably be 
limited to larger racial/ethnic subgroups. However, with a 
projected increase in the participation of minorities in the 
Navy, such work should become more feasible. 
Although some of the results of this thesis coincide with 
the results of other authors (Cooke and Quester, 1992; 
Robinson and Prevetta, 1992) who use different methodologies, 
multiple regression analysis (if used correctly) seems to 
produce more reliable results, when compared with other 
methods, such as cross tabulations and control charts. 
The R-squared values for the basic models are fairly 
high, indicating the highly predictive power of these basic 
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models. This is reenforced by the highly significant 
individual coefficients for the control variables. Although 
one never knows whether the chosen model specification 
includes all relevant variables, the chosen set of explanatory 
variables (in their specific form) produces coefficients with 
the power to reliably forecast time-in-service to the grades 
E-4, E-5, and E-6. 
C.  EFFECTIVENESS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS 
As previously mentioned, one method to analyze the 
possible effect of equal opportunity programs on promotion 
times within the three cohorts would be to use multiple 
regression analysis (for each cohort separately). The problem 
is that these regression results only indirectly reflect on 
how Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action programs have 
worked with respect to promotions. This is, because the Navy's 
Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action programs were 
introduced more than a decade ago, and more than one program 
shared the common objective of increasing equal opportunity 
awareness. Since the population in question cannot be divided 
in two subgroups (pre-treatment group and post-treatment 
group), a direct comparison of the pre-EO and post-EO periods 
is not possible. Although there are statistical procedures who 
could resolve this dilemma, they are beyond the focus of this 
thesis. 
However, it may be possible to draw some inferences from 
the results provided by the statistical analysis. This 
discussion will put the regression results into context. Dye 
(1994) describes the evolution of Navy service-wide programs: 
. . . the Navy began its first efforts at increasing 
racial awareness in January 1972 with Navy-wide race 
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relations training. By 19 78, the Navy had instituted the 
Navy Affirmative Action Plan (NAAP), a comprehensive 
equal opportunity program still in effect today. The NAAP 
identifies specific categories in which the Navy will 
take positive, affirmative steps to achieve a 
demographically-balanced composition of personnel 
ensuring fair treatment and freedom from discrimination. 
Promotion . . . [is] among the categories 
monitored. (Dye, 1994, p. 23) 
The expectation for the results of the regressions 
then may be that promotion times for minorities have been 
decreasing, thereby approaching the values of the majority. 
Although the author does not know what the time-to-promotion 
would be in the absence of equal opportunity programs, the 
results indicate that the promotion times for racial or ethnic 
minorities do not always decrease. In some instances it takes 
minorities additional months to make the grade compared to 
older cohorts. On the other hand, for other minorities and for 
other grades in question, these data suggest an improvement in 
the situation for the more recent cohort members. 
The trend observed for promotion to E-4 is reversed for 
promotion to E-6 (refer to Table VIII) . Looking back from 1985 
cohort data, the time to promotion for members of 
racial/ethnic minorities has improved dramatically. One could 
speculate from these data that Equal Opportunity and 
Affirmative Action programs for racial/ethnic minorities may 
be more effective in the more senior ranks of the enlisted 
force. However, the data imply that in 1992 there is still a 
disadvantage of about two additional months for a 
racial/ethnic minority member in promotion to E-6. This number 
is impressively low (less than seven percent) compared with 
the comparable additional nine months to promotion for cohort 
1979. One may carefully interpret these numbers as indicating 
progress due to equal opportunity awareness caused in part by 
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equal opportunity programs. 
The results of this analysis support the conclusion that 
racial/ethnic minorities, as a whole, have slower times to 
promotion to E-4, E-5, and E-6 in the Navy, all else equal. 
However, the magnitude of the difference between minorities 
and the majority decreases for more recent cohorts and for 
promotion to more senior grades. The data imply that the 
Navy's equal opportunity programs may have helped in reducing 
promotion times for racial/ethnic minority members. However, 
since racial/ethnic minorities generally advance through the 
ranks at a slower rate than their majority counterparts, it is 
recommended that these programs be maintained. 
It should be noted that the general trend for minorities 
results mostly from the outcome of the largest component 
group, blacks or African-American. The promotion situation for 
smaller groups of racial/ethnic minorities may be quite 
different: that is, some have an extremely longer time for 
promotion to any of the grades in question, while others are 
promoted faster than the majority. Although the results for 
these smaller groups are not all significant, one may conclude 
that equal opportunity programs in the Navy may have been more 
successful worked for blacks more than for some other 
racial/ethnic minorities. Further, the data suggest that there 
is still a need for equal opportunity and affirmative action 
programs. Progress has been made in creating a system of 
promotion that is increasingly fair with respect to 
racial/ethnic minorities. But there is still progress to make, 
as the results of this study show; and, after achieving equal 
promotion times for "racial/ethnic minority members" as a 
whole, smaller minority groups (Filipino-Americans for 
example) may still be in particular need of equal opportunity 
initiatives. 
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APPENDIX A. CONTENTS PROCEDURE 













11:50 Wednesday, March 29, 1995 
Observation Length:   872 
Last Modified: 11:50 Wednesday, March 29, 1995 
Deleted Observations: 0 
Compressed: NO 
Sorted: NO 
■Engine/Host Dependent Information- 
Data Set Page Size: 
Number of Data Set Pages 
File Format: 
First Data Page: 
Max Obs per Page: 
Obs in First Data Page: 
Physical Name: 
Release Created: 
Release Last Modified: 
Created by: 
Last Modified by: 
Subextents: 















■Alphabetic List of Variables and Attributes- 
#   Variable   Type   Len   Pos 
61 AFQT1 Num 
63 AFQT4 Num 
9 AFQTGRPS Num 
8 AFQTPRCT Num 
62 AFQT3B Num 
64 AGESQ Num 
79 ALEUT Num 
108 AMIN RE Num 
74 ASIANAM Num 
71 BLACK Num 
86 BLACK RE Num 
81 CHINESE Num 
16 COHORTFY Num 
48 CPGRDM10 Num 
51 CPGRDM11 Num 
54 CPGRDM12 Num 
57 CPGRDM13 Num 
60 CPGRDM14 Num 
21 CPGRDMY1 Num 
24 CPGRDMY2 Num 
27 CPGRDMY3 Num 
30 CPGRDMY4 Num 
33 CPGRDMY5 Num 
36 CPGRDMY6 Num 
39 CPGRDMY7 Num 
42 CPGRDMY8 Num 
45 CPGRDMY9 Num 
47 CPGRDY10 Num 
50 CPGRDY11 Num 
53 CPGRDY12 Num 
56 CPGRDY13 Num 
59 CPGRDY14 Num 
20 CPGRDYY1 Num 
23 CPGRDYY2 Num 
26 CPGRDYY3 Num 
29 CPGRDYY4 Num 
32 CPGRDYY5 Num 
35 CPGRDYY6 Num 
38 CPGRDYY7 Num 
41 CPGRDYY8 Num 
44 CPGRDYY9 Num 
80 CUBAN Num 
95 E4 Num 
96 E5 Num 
97 E6 Num 
















































15 ENTRGRAD Num 8 112 
11 ENTRSTAT Num 8 80 
1 ENTRYAGE Num 8 0 
13 ENTRYDTM Num 8 96 
12 ENTRYDTY Num 8 88 
78 ESKIMO Num 8 616 
5 ETHNIC Num 8 32 
76 FILIPIN Num 8 600 
107 HISP RE Num 8 848 
2 HIYREDUC Num 8 
100 INDIAN Num 8 792 
109 ISLA RE Num 8 864 
82 JAPANESE Num 8 648 
83 KOREAN Num 8 656 
98 LATINAM Num 8 776 
87 MALAYAN Num 8 688 
68 MARR Num 8 536 
70 MARRPL Num 8 552 
7 MARST DP Num 8 48 
103 MELANES Num 8 816 
77 MEXICAN Num 8 608 
104 MICRONES Num 8 824 
89 MONTHIN Num 8 704 
90 MONTHOUT Num 8 712 
73 NATIND Num 8 576 
102 OASIAN Num 8 808 
66 OBLIL Num 8 520 
65 OBLIS Num 8 512 
99 OHISPAN Num 8 784 
46 PGRAD10 Num 8 360 
49 PGRAD11 Num 8 384 
52 PGRAD12 Num 8 408 
55 PGRAD13 Num 8 432 
58 PGRAD14 Num 8 456 
19 PGRADY1 Num 8 144                  1 
22 PGRADY2 Num 8 168                  1 
25 PGRADY3 Num 8 192                  1 
28 PGRADY4 Num 8 216                  1 
31 PGRADY5 Num 8 240                  1 
34 PGRADY6 Num 8 264 
37 PGRADY7 Num 8 288 
40 PGRADY8 Num 8 312 
43 PGRADY9 Num 8 336 
105 POLYNES Num 8 832 
10 PRIORSVC Num 8 72 
75 PUERTRI Num 8 592 
4 RACE Num 8 24 
6 RACETHNC Num 8 40 
18 SEPDAT M Num 8 136 
17 SEPDAT Y Num 8 128 
3 SEX Num 8 16 
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67 SINGLE Num 8 528 
69 SINGLEPL Num 8 544 
72 SPANISH Num 8 568 
88 STILSVC Num 8 696 
91 TINSVC Num 8 720 
92 TT0E4 Num 8 728 
93 TTOE5 Num 8 736 
94 TTOE6 Num 8 744 
101 VIETNAM Num 8 800 
106 WHITE Num 8 840 
84 WHITENSP Num 8 664 
85 WHITESPN Num 8 672 
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APPENDIX B. CODING FOR DATASET 
//DIPL05A   JOB USER=S1317;CLASS=B 
//   EXEC SAS 
//SASFL   DD DISP=SHR,DSN=MSS.S1317.0RIG9 
//SASFOUT DD DISP=(OLD,KEEP),DSN=MSS.S1317.ABRI9 
//SYSIN DD * 
DATA SASFOUT.ABRI9(KEEP= 
COHORTFY 
RACE ETHNIC RACETHNC SEPDAT_M SEPDAT_Y 
ENTRYDTM ENTRYDTY ENTRYAGE SEX MARST_DP 
AFQTPRCT ENTRGRAD PRIORSVC ENTRSTAT 
HIYREDUC MONTHIN MONTHOUT STILSVC TINSVC 
PGRADY1 PGRADY2 PGRADY3 
PGRADY6 PGRADY5 PGRADY4 
PGRADY7 PGRADY8 PGRADY9 
PGRAD12 PGRADll PGRAD10 
PGRAD13 PGRAD14 
SINGLE SINGLEPL MARR MARRPL 
AFQTGRPS AFQT1 AFQT3B AFQT4 
AGESQ ENLTERM OBLIS OBLIL 















SPANISH NATIND ASIANAM PUERTRI FILIPIN 
MEXICAN ESKIMO ALEUT CUBAN CHINESE 
JAPANESE KOREAN 
WHITENSP WHITESPN BLACK_RE MALAYAN 
LATINAM OHISPAN INDIAN VIETNAM OASIAN 
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MELANES MICRONES POLYNES WHITE HISP_RE 
AMIN RE ISLA RE; 
SET SASFL.ORIG9 ; 
IF RACE > 0 
IF ETHNIC > 0 
IF RACETHNC > 
IF SEPDAT_Y > 
AND COHORTFY 
(SEPDAT_Y > 8 
AND COHORTFY 
(SEPDAT_Y > 8 
AND COHORTFY 
SEPDAT_Y = 0 













IF ENTRYAGE > 
ENTRYAGE < 
IF SEX > 0 
IF MARST_DP > 
IF AFQTPRCT > 
IF ENTRGRAD > 
IF PRIORSVC = 
IF ENTRSTAT > 
IF ENTRGRAD < 
0 
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IF AFQTGRPS GE 6 THEN AFQT1 = 1; 
ELSE AFQT1 = 0; 
IF AFQTGRPS =  5 THEN AFQT3B = 1; 
ELSE AFQT3B   = 0; 
IF AFQTGRPS = 2 OR AFQTGRPS = 3 OR AFQTGRPS 
THEN AFQT4   = 1; 
ELSE AFQT4    = 0; 
AGESQ = ENTRYAGE * ENTRYAGE; 
IF ENLTERM LE 3 THEN OBLIS = 1; 
ELSE OBLIS = 0; 
IF ENLTERM GT 3 THEN OBLIL = 1; 
= 4 
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ELSE OBLIL = 0; 
IF MARST_DP = 10  THEN SINGLE = 1; 
ELSE SINGLE = 0; 
IF MARST_DP =20  THEN MARR = 1; 
ELSE MARR = 0; 
IF MARST_DP GT 10 AND MARST_DP LT 20 THEN SINGLEPL = 1; 
ELSE SINGLEPL = 0; 
IF MARST_DP GT 20  THEN MARRPL = 1; 
ELSE MARRPL = 0; 
/* =====CREATING VALID DUMMYS FOR RACE===== */ 
IF COHORTFY = 79 AND 
RACE = 2 THEN BLACK = 1; 
ELSE BLACK = 0; 
IF COHORTFY = 79 AND 
ETHNIC = 1 THEN SPANISH = 1; 
ELSE SPANISH = 0; 
IF COHORTFY = 79 AND 
ETHNIC = 2 THEN NATIND  = 1; 
ELSE NATIND  = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
ETHNIC = 3 THEN ASIANAM = 1; 
ELSE ASIANAM = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
ETHNIC = 4 THEN PUERTRI = 1; 
ELSE PUERTRI = 0; 
IF COHORTFY = 79 AND 
ETHNIC = 5 THEN FILIPIN = 1; 
ELSE FILIPIN = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
ETHNIC = 6 THEN MEXICAN = 1; 
ELSE MEXICAN = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
ETHNIC = 7 THEN ESKIMO =  1; 
ELSE ESKIMO = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
ETHNIC = 8 THEN ALEUT  =  1; 
ELSE ALEUT = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
ETHNIC = 9 THEN CUBAN =   1; 
ELSE CUBAN = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
ETHNIC = 10 THEN CHINESE  = 1; 
ELSE CHINESE = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
ETHNIC = 11 THEN JAPANESE = 1; 
ELSE JAPANESE = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
ETHNIC = 12 THEN KOREAN  = 1; 
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ELSE KOREAN = 0; 
IF COHORTFY = 79 AND 
RACETHNC = 1 THEN WHITENSP = 1; 
ELSE WHITENSP = 0; 
IF COHORTFY = 79 AND 
RACETHNC = 2 THEN WHITESPN = 1; 
ELSE WHITESPN = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
RACETHNC = 3 THEN BLACK_RE = 1; 
ELSE BLACK_RE = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =79 AND 
RACETHNC = 4 THEN MALAYAN = 1; 
ELSE MALAYAN = 0; 
/* ========CREATING THE TIMELINE=========== */ 
IF SEPDAT_Y = 0  THEN STILSVC = 1; 
ELSE STILSVC = 0; 
IF ENTRYDTY =78 THEN MONTHIN = ENTRYDTM ; 
IF ENTRYDTY = 79 THEN MONTHIN = ENTRYDTM + 12; 
IF SEPDAT_Y =78 AND COHORTFY =79 
THEN MONTHOUT = SEPDAT_M ; 
IF SEPDAT_Y > 78 AND COHORTFY =79 
THEN MONTHOUT = SEPDAT_M +12 
+ ((SEPDAT_Y - 79) * 12); 
IF ENTRYDTY =81 THEN MONTHIN = ENTRYDTM ; 
IF ENTRYDTY = 82 THEN MONTHIN = ENTRYDTM + 12; 
IF SEPDAT_Y =81 AND COHORTFY =82 
THEN MONTHOUT = SEPDAT_M ; 
IF SEPDAT_Y > 81 AND COHORTFY =82 
THEN MONTHOUT = SEPDAT_M +12 
+ ((SEPDAT_Y - 82) * 12); 
IF ENTRYDTY =84 THEN MONTHIN = ENTRYDTM ; 
IF ENTRYDTY = 85 THEN MONTHIN = ENTRYDTM + 12; 
IF SEPDAT_Y =84 AND COHORTFY =85 
THEN MONTHOUT = SEPDAT_M ; 
IF SEPDAT_Y > 84 AND COHORTFY =85 
THEN MONTHOUT = SEPDAT_M + 12 
+ ((SEPDAT_Y - 85) * 12); 
TINSVC = MONTHOUT - MONTHIN; 
/* ========CREATING THE PROMOTIONTIMELINE=========== */ 
IF PGRADY1 = 4 AND 
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CPGRDYY1 =78 THEN TT0E4 = CPGRDMY1 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY1 = 4 AND 
CPGRDYY1 GT 78 THEN TT0E4 = CPGRDMY1 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY1 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY2 = 4 AND 
PGRADY1 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY2 =78 THEN TT0E4 = CPGRDMY2 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY2 = 4 AND 
PGRADY1 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY2 GT 78 THEN TTOE4 = CPGRDMY2 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY2 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY3 = 4 AND 
PGRADY2 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY3 =78 THEN TT0E4 = CPGRDMY3 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY3 = 4 AND 
PGRADY2 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY3 GT 78 THEN TTOE4 = CPGRDMY3 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY3 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY4 = 4 AND 
PGRADY3 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY4 =78 THEN TT0E4 = CPGRDMY4 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY4 = 4 AND 
PGRADY3 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY4 GT 78 THEN TTOE4 = CPGRDMY4 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY4 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY5 - 4 AND 
PGRADY4 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY5 =78 THEN TTOE4 = CPGRDMY5 - MONTHIN;  ' 
IF PGRADY5 = 4 AND 
PGRADY4 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY5 GT 78 THEN TTOE4 = CPGRDMY5 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY5 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY6 = 4 AND 
PGRADY5 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY6 =78 THEN TTOE4 = CPGRDMY6 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY6 = 4 AND 
PGRADY5 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY6 GT 78 THEN TT0E4 = CPGRDMY6 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY6 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY7 = 4 AND 
PGRADY6 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY7 =78 THEN TTOE4 = CPGRDMY7 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY7 = 4 AND 
PGRADY6 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY7 GT 78 THEN TT0E4 = CPGRDMY7 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY7 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY8 = 4 AND 
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PGRADY7 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY8 =78 THEN TT0E4 = CPGRDMY8 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY8 = 4 AND 
PGRADY7 LT 4 AND 
CPGRDYY8 GT 78 THEN TTOE4 = CPGRDMY8 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY8 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY1 = 5 AND 
CPGRDYY1 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY1 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY1 = 5 AND 
CPGRDYY1 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY1 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY1 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY2 = 5 AND 
PGRADY1 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY2 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY2 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY2 = 5 AND 
PGRADY1 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY2 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY2 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY2 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY3 = 5 AND 
PGRADY2 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY3 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY3 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY3 = 5 AND 
PGRADY2 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY3 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY3 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY3 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY4 = 5 AND 
PGRADY3 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY4 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY4 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY4 = 5 AND 
PGRADY3 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY4 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY4 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY4 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY5 = 5 AND 
PGRADY4 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY5 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY5 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY5 = 5 AND 
PGRADY4 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY5 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY5 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY5 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY6 = 5 AND 
PGRADY5 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY6 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY6 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY6 = 5 AND 
PGRADY5 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY6 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY6 + 12 - MONTHIN 
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+ ((CPGRDYY6 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY7 = 5 AND 
PGRADY6 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY7 =78 THEN TT0E5 = CPGRDMY7 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY7 = 5 AND 
PGRADY6 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY7 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY7 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY7 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY8 = 5 AND 
PGRADY7 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY8 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY8 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY8 = 5 AND 
PGRADY7 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY8 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY8 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY8 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY9 = 5 AND 
PGRADY8 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY9 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY9 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY9 = 5 AND 
PGRADY8 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDYY9 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDMY9 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY9 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRAD10 = 5 AND 
PGRADY9 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDY10 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDM10 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRAD10= 5 AND 
PGRADY9 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDY10 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDM10 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDY10 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRAD11 = 5 AND 
PGRAD10 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDY11 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDM11 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRAD11 = 5 AND 
PGRAD10 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDY11 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDM11 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDY11 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRAD12 = 5 AND 
PGRAD11 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDY12 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDM12 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRAD12 = 5 AND 
PGRAD11 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDY12 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDM12 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDY12 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRAD13 = 5 AND 
PGRAD12 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDY13 =78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDM13 - MONTHIN; 
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IF PGRAD13 = 5 AND 
PGRAD12 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDY13 GT 78 THEN TT0E5 = CPGRDM13 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ( (CPGRDY13 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRAD14 = 5 AND 
PGRAD13 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDY14 = 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDM14 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRAD14 = 5 AND 
PGRAD13 LT 5 AND 
CPGRDY14 GT 78 THEN TTOE5 = CPGRDM14 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDY14 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY1 = 6 AND 
CPGRDYY1 =78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMY1 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY1 = 6 AND 
CPGRDYY1 GT 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMY1 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY1 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY2 = 6 AND 
PGRADY1 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY2 =78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMY2 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY2 = 6 AND 
PGRADY1 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY2 GT 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMY2 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY2 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY3 = 6 AND 
PGRADY2 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY3 = 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMY3 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY3 = 6 AND 
PGRADY2 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY3 GT 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMY3 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY3 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY4 = 6 AND 
PGRADY3 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY4 =78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMY4 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY4 = 6 AND 
PGRADY3 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY4 GT 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMY4 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY4 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY5 = 6 AND 
PGRADY4 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY5 = 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMY5 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY5 = 6 AND 
PGRADY4 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY5 GT 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMY5 + 12 - MONTHIN 
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+ ((CPGRDYY5 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY6 = 6 AND 
PGRADY5 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY6 = 78 THEN TT0E6 = CPGRDMY6 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY6 = 6 AND 
PGRADY5 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY6 GT 78 THEN TT0E6 = CPGRDMY6 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY6 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY7 = 6 AND 
PGRADY6 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY7 =78 THEN TT0E6 = CPGRDMY7 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY7 = 6 AND 
PGRADY6 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY7 GT 78 THEN TT0E6 = CPGRDMY7 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY7 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY8 = 6 AND 
PGRADY7 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY8 =78 THEN TT0E6 = CPGRDMY8 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY8 = 6 AND 
PGRADY7 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY8 GT 78 THEN TT0E6 = CPGRDMY8 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY8 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY9 = 6 AND 
PGRADY8 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY9 =78 THEN TT0E6 = CPGRDMY9 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY9 = 6 AND 
PGRADY8 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYY9 GT 78 THEN TT0E6 = CPGRDMY9 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY9 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRAD10 = 6 AND 
PGRADY9 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYIO = 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDM10 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRAD10= 6 AND 
PGRADY9 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDYIO GT 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDMIO + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYIO - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRAD11 = 6 AND 
PGRADIO LT 6 AND 
CPGRDY11 = 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDM11 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRAD11 = 6 AND 
PGRADIO LT 6 AND 
CPGRDY11 GT 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDM11 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDY11 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRAD12 = 6 AND 
PGRAD11 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDY12 =78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDM12 - MONTHIN; 
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IF PGRAD12 = 6 AND 
PGRAD11 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDY12 GT 78 THEN TT0E6 = CPGRDM12 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDY12 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRAD13 = 6 AND 
PGRAD12 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDY13 = 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDM13 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRAD13 = 6 AND 
PGRAD12 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDY13 GT 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDM13 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDY13 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRAD14 = 6 AND 
PGRAD13 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDY14 = 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDM14 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRAD14 = 6 AND 
PGRAD13 LT 6 AND 
CPGRDY14 GT 78 THEN TTOE6 = CPGRDM14 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDY14 - 79) * 12) ; 
/* ADDITIONAL CODING FOR THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS */ 
IF HISP_RE = 1 OR WHITESPN = 1 THEN HISPANIC = 1; 
ELSE HISPANIC = 0; 
IF OHISPAN = 1 OR SPANISH = 1 THEN OHISP = 1; 
ELSE OHISP = 0; 
IF ASIANAM = 1 OR ESKIMO = 1 OR ALEUT = 1 OR CUBAN = 1 
OR CHINESE = 1 OR JAPANESE = 1 OR KOREAN = 1 
OR MALAYAN = 1 OR LATINAM = 1 OR INDIAN = 1 
OR VIETNAM = 1 OR OASIAN = 1 OR MELANES = 1 
OR MICRONES = 1 OR POLYNES = 1 OR AMIN_RE = 1 
OR SPANISH = 1 OR NATIND = 1 OR PUERTRI = 1 
OR FILIPIN = 1 OR MEXICAN = 1 OR WHITESPN = 1 
OR BLACK = 1 OR LATINAM = 1 OR OHISPAN = 1 
OR HISP_RE = 1 
OR ISLA_RE = 1 THEN MINORITY =1 ; 
ELSE MINORITY = 0; 
IF COHORTFY = 79 THEN FISCAL79 = 1; 
ELSE FISCAL79 = 0; 
IF COHORTFY = 82 THEN FISCAL82 = 1; 
ELSE FISCAL82 = 0; 
IF COHORTFY =85 THEN FISCAL85 = 1; 
ELSE FISCAL85 = 0; 
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HIYREDSQ = HIYREDUC * HIYREDUC; 
DETERMSQ = (ENTRYAGE-HIYREDUC) * (ENTRYAGE-HIYREDUC) ; 
IF PGRADY1 = 3 AND 
CPGRDYY1 =78 THEN TT0E3 = CPGRDMY1 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY1 = 3 AND 
CPGRDYY1 GT 78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY1 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY1 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY2 = 3 AND 
PGRADY1 LT 3 AND 
CPGRDYY2 =78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY2 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY2 = 3 AND 
PGRADY1 LT 3 AND 
CPGRDYY2 GT 78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY2 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY2 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY3 = 3 AND 
PGRADY2 LT 3 AND 
CPGRDYY3 =78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY3 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY3 = 3 AND 
PGRADY2 LT 3 AND 
CPGRDYY3 GT 78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY3 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY3 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY4 = 3 AND 
PGRADY3 LT 3 AND 
CPGRDYY4 =78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY4 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY4 = 3 AND 
PGRADY3 LT 3 AND 
CPGRDYY4 GT 78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY4 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY4 - 79) * 12); 
IF PGRADY5 = 3 AND 
PGRADY4 LT 3 AND 
CPGRDYY5 = 78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY5 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY5 = 3 AND 
PGRADY4 LT 3 AND 
CPGRDYY5 GT 78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY5 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY5 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY6 = 3 AND 
PGRADY5 LT 3 AND 
CPGRDYY6 = 78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY6 - MONTHIN; 
IF PGRADY6 - 3 AND 
PGRADY5 LT 3 AND 
CPGRDYY6 GT 78 THEN TTOE3 = CPGRDMY6 + 12 - MONTHIN 
+ ((CPGRDYY6 - 79) * 12) ; 
IF PGRADY2 = 0 AND PGRADY1 = 3 
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THEN PTT0E4 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY2 GE 3 THEN PTT0E4 = .; 
IF PGRADY3 = 0 AND PGRADY2 = 3 
THEN PTT0E4 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY3 GE 3 THEN PTT0E4 = .; 
IF PGRADY4 = 0 AND PGRADY3 = 3 
THEN PTT0E4 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY4 GE 3 THEN PTT0E4 = .; 
IF PGRADY5 = 0 AND PGRADY4 = 3 
THEN PTT0E4 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY5 GE 3 THEN PTT0E4 = .; 
IF PGRADY6 = 0 AND PGRADY5 = 3 
THEN PTT0E4 = TINSVC * 1; 
IF PGRADY6 GE 3 THEN PTT0E4 = .; 
IF PGRADY7 = 0 AND PGRADY6 = 3 
THEN PTT0E4 = TINSVC * 1; 
IF PGRADY7 GE 3 THEN PTT0E4 = .; 
IF PGRADY8 = 0 AND PGRADY7 = 3 
THEN PTT0E4 = TINSVC * 1; 
IF PGRADY8 GE 3 THEN PTT0E4 = .; 
IF PGRADY9 = 0 AND PGRADY8 = 3 
THEN PTT0E4 = TINSVC * 1; 
IF PGRADY9 GE 3 THEN PTT0E4 = .; 
IF PGRADY2 = 0 AND PGRADY1 = 4 
THEN PTT0E5 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY2 GE 4 THEN PTT0E5 = .; 
IF PGRADY3 = 0 AND PGRADY2 = 4 
THEN PTT0E5 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY3 GE 4 THEN PTT0E5 = .; 
IF PGRADY4 = 0 AND PGRADY3 = 4 
THEN PTT0E5 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY4 GE 4 THEN PTT0E5 = .; 
IF PGRADY5 = 0 AND PGRADY4 = 4 
THEN PTT0E5 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY5 GE 4 THEN PTT0E5 = .; 
IF PGRADY6 = 0 AND PGRADY5 = 4 
THEN PTT0E5 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY6 GE 4 THEN PTT0E5 = .; 
IF PGRADY7 = 0 AND PGRADY6 = 4 
THEN PTT0E5 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY7 GE 4 THEN PTT0E5 = .; 
IF PGRADY8 = 0 AND PGRADY7 = 4 
THEN PTT0E5 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY8 GE 4 THEN PTT0E5 = .; 
IF PGRADY9 = 0 AND PGRADY8 = 4 
THEN PTT0E5 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY9 GE 4 THEN PTT0E5 = .; 
IF PGRAD10 = 0 AND PGRADY9 = 4 
THEN PTTOE5 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADIO GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
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IF PGRAD11 = 0 AND PGRAD10 = 4 
THEN PTTOE5 = TINSVC * 1 , 
IF PGRAD11 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRAD12 = 0 AND PGRAD11 = 4 
THEN PTTOE5 = TINSVC * 1 , 
IF PGRAD12 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRAD13 = 0 AND PGRAD12 = 4 
THEN PTTOE5 = TINSVC * 1 ; 
IF PGRAD13 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRAD14 = 0 AND PGRAD13 = 4 
THEN PTTOE5 = TINSVC * 1 ; 
IF PGRAD14 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRADY2 = 0 AND PGRADY1 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 ; 
IF PGRADY2 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRADY3 = 0 AND PGRADY2 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 ; 
IF PGRADY3 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRADY4 = 0 AND PGRADY3 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 , 
IF PGRADY4 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRADY5 = 0 AND PGRADY4 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY5 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRADY6 = 0 AND PGRADY5 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY6 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRADY7 = 0 AND PGRADY6 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY7 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRADY8 = 0 AND PGRADY7 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY8 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRADY9 = 0 AND PGRADY8 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADY9 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRADIO = 0 AND PGRADY9 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRADIO GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRAD11 = 0 AND PGRADIO = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRAD11 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRAD12 = 0 AND PGRAD11 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRAD12 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRAD13 = 0 AND PGRAD12 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 - TINSVC * 1 
IF PGRAD13 GE 4 THEN PTTOE5 = .; 
IF PGRAD14 = 0 AND PGRAD13 = 5 
THEN PTTOE6 = TINSVC * 1; 
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IF PGRAD14 GE 4 THEN PTT0E5 = 
IF PTT0E4 GT 
IF PTT0E4 = . 
IF PTT0E5 GT 
IF PTT0E5 = . 
IF PTT0E6 GT 
IF PTT0E6 = . 
THEN NEWTT0E4 = PTT0E4 
THEN NEWTT0E4 = E4 
THEN NEWTT0E5 = PTT0E5 
THEN NEWTT0E5 = E5 
THEN NEWTT0E6 = PTT0E6 







IF MOSINDEP GT 0 THEN DEP = 1; 
ELSE DEP = 0; 
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APPENDIX C. REGRESSION MODELS 
Model: MODEL1 
dent Variable: NEWTT0E4 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of       Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value      Prob>F 
Model 21 8673822.3542 413039.15972 2231 157       0.0001 
Error 164136 30385394 788 185.12328062 
C Total 164157 39059217 142 
Root . MSE 13.60600 R-square 0.2221 
Dep Mean 27.85524 Adj R-sq 0.2220 
C.V. 48.84539 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard   T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error  Parameter=0 Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 54.442587 0.64795996 84.022 0.0001 
FISCAL79 1 0.366173 0.08597233 4.259 0.0001 
FISCAL82 1 2.098092 0.08215269 25.539 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 0.005349 0.00227925 2.347 0.0189 
SEX 1 0.318747 0.10646065 2.994 0.0028 
AFQT1 1 -4.610235 0.08222637 -56.068 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 .900483    0 .11280310 16.848 0.0001 
DEP 1 -1.376593 0.16697304 -8.244 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -6.276788 0.04506272 -139.290 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -3.763520 0.17912024 -21.011 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.204057 0.00772846 26.403 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.010662 0.00330329 -3.228 0.0012 
OBLIS 1 -0.986894 0.49185247 -2.006 0.0448 
SINGLEPL 1 -1.834872 0.37438103 -4.901 0.0001 
MARRPL 1 -2.371276 0.16646198 -14.245 0.0001 
BLACK 1 2.705209 0.09932842 27.235 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 .069781    0 .31877286 3.356 0.0008 
OHISP 1 0.313041 0.50856546 0.616 0.5382 
MEXICAN 1 0.456251 0.37053600 1.231 0.2182 
PUERTRI 1 .652344    0 .44459038 3.717 0.0002 
FILIPIN 1 0.224544 0.37754019 0.595 0.5520 
NATIND 1 2.788387 0.67911924 4.106 0.0001 
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Model: M0DEL2 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E5 
Analysis of Variance 
Slim of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 22   12843209.2 583782.23634 2461 579 0.0001 
Error 74602 17692430 587 237.15759077 
C Total 74624 30535639 786 
Root . MSE 15.39992 R-square 0.4206 
Dep Mean 46.89339 Adj R-sq 0.4204 
C.V. 32.84028 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > jTj 
INTERCEP 1 34.118515 1.21290748 28.130 0.0001 
FISCAL79 1 -2.130723 0.14577252 -14.617 0.0001 
FISCAL82 1 -0.669946 0.14175086 -4.726 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.013545 0.00386366 -3.506 0.0005 
SEX 1 0.807795 0.18297292 4.415 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -1.958333 0.14962644 -13.088 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 3.703080 0.21171236 17.491 0.0001 
DEP 1 0.016844 0.30610872 0.055 0.9561 
ENTRGRAD 1 .967706    0 .07639723 25.756 0 .0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -1.736016 0.32623279 -5.321 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.104282 0.01426277 7.312 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 0.012307 0.00558308 2.204 0.0275 
OBLIS 1 .454930    0 .86070078 1.690 0 .0910 
SINGLEPL 1 0.088597 0.59628880 0.149 0.8819 
MARRPL 1 -1.158819 0.25469550 -4.550 0.0001 
E4 1 0.902920 0.00475869 189.741 0.0001 
BLACK 1 2.969506 0.17395207 17.071 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 0.566578 0.56021111 1.011 0.3118 
OHISP 1 .710544    0 .91762137 1.864 0 .0623 
MEXICAN 1 .111998    0 .65281135 1.703 0 .0885 
PUERTRI 1 .673575    0 .76016221 2.202 0 .0277 
FILIPIN 1 3.971153 0.55789221 7.118 0.0001 
NATIND 1 -1.748430 1.25128827 -1.397 0.1623 
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Model: M0DEL3 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E6 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of        Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 23 6198788.2189 269512.53126 568.527 0.0001 
Error 57490   27253366.1 474.05402853 
C Total 57513 33452154 .319 
Root . MSE 21.77278 R-square 0.1853 
Dep Mean 76.49823 Adj R-sq 0.1850 
C.V. 28.46181 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard   T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error  Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP l 61.214766 1.95862505 31.254 0.0001 
FISCAL79 l 13.460385 0.24964726 53.918 0.0001 
FISCAL82 1 9.797054 0.24493693 39.998 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.004329 0.00624234 -0.693 0.4880 
SEX 1 3.231552 0.30036517 10.759 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -2.222155 0.24812842 -8.956 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 3.481574 0.36166562 9.627 0.0001 
DEP 1 -0.617737 0.52241921 -1.182 0.2370 
ENTRGRAD 1 -0.955178 0.12225179 -7.813 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -2.654361 0.52160141 -5.089 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.151725 0.02265555 6.697 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 0.011491 0.00906255 1.268 0.2048 
OBLIS 1 0.533625 1.42123032 0.375 0.7073 
SINGLEPL 1 -0.473015 0.96140150 -0.492 0.6227 
MARRPL 1 .733569    0 .42048512 4.123 0.0001 
E4 1 -0.184968 0.00975005 -18.971 0.0001 
E5 1 0.434915 0.00647238 67.196 0.0001 
BLACK 1 6.831268 0.30598380 22.326 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 0.943340 0.87202878 1.082 0.2794 
OHISP 1 -0.020015 1.50546054 -0.013 0.9894 
MEXICAN 1 0.465867 1.03597390 0.450 0.6529 
PUERTRI 1 2.508287 1.26323856 1.986 0.0471 
FILIPIN 1 11.577590 1.02168142 11.332 0.0001 
NATIND 1 -3.480770 2.11838688 -1.643 0.1004 
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Model: M0DEL4 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E4 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 15 8652072. 4512 576804.1 33008 3113.673 0.0001 
Error 164142 30407144 .691 185.24902031 
C Total 164157 39059217 .142 
Root . MSE 13.61062 R-square 0.2215 
Dep Mean 27.85524 Adj R-sq 0.2214 
C.V. 48.86197 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 54.495869 0.64791675 84.109 0.0001 
FISCAL79 1 0.348001 0.08592009 4.050 0.0001 
FISCAL82 l 2.116487 0.08217398 25.756 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 0.005491 0.00227988 2.409 0.0160 
SEX 1 0.360314 0.10640465 3.386 0.0007 
AFQT1 1 -4.645534 0.08216061 -56.542 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 1.940654 0.11277614 17.208 0.0001 
DEP 1 -1.369519 0.16702645 -8.199 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -6.259999 0.04503086 -139.016 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -3.775182 0.17915726 -21.072 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.203965 0.00772979 26.387 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.011192 0.00330391 -3.388 0.0007 
OBLIS 1 -0.971809 0.49201468 -1.975 0.0483 
SINGLEPL 1 -1.750309 0.37440341 -4.675 0.0001 
MARRPL 1 -2.399027 0.16648884 -14.410 0.0001 
MINORITY l 2.285267 0.08674301 26.345 0.0001 
Durbin-Watson D 1.995 
(For Number of Obs.)      164158 
1st Order Autocorrelation  0.002 
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Model: M0DEL5 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E5 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of        Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 16 12834413 .635 802150.85217 3380.945 0.0001 
Error 74608 17701226 .152 237.25640885 
C Total 74624 30535639 .786 
Root . MSE 15.40313 R-square 0.4203 
Dep Mean 46.89339 Adj R-sq 0.4202 
C.V. 32.84713 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard   T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error  Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 33.987159 1.21269129 28.026 0.0001 
FISCAL79 1 -2.134892 0.14569138 -14.654 0.0001 
FISCAL82 1 -0.646383 0.14176776 -4.559 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.013342 0.00386401 -3.453 0.0006 
SEX 1 0.825761 0.18269085 4.520 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -1.997325 0.14946406 -13.363 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 3.727789 0.21166543 17.612 0.0001 
DEP 1 0.025680 0.30616828 0.084 0.9332 
ENTRGRAD 1 1.961536 0.07629915 25.708 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -1.715614 0.32625743 -5.258 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.102911 0.01426279 7.215 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 0.012113 0.00558334 2.170 0.0300 
OBLIS 1 1.514788 0.86079436 1.760 0.0785 
SINGLEPL 1 0.075563 0.59613212 0.127 0.8991 
MARRPL 1 -1.174207 0.25471343 -4.610 0.0001 
E4 1 0.902904 0.00475908 189.722 0.0001 
MINORITY 1 2.649189 0.15126286 17.514 0.0001 
Durbin-Watson D 1.995 
(For Number of Obs.)       74625 
1st Order Autocorrelation  0.003 
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Model: M0DEL6 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E6 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 17 6148604. 7367 361682.« 53157 761.634 0.0001 
Error 57496 27303549 .582 474.87737551 
C Total 57513 33452154 .319 
Root . MSE 21.79168 R-square 0.1838 




Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 60.665425 1.95939095 30.961 0.0001 
FISCAL79 1 13.518192 0.24967484 54.143 0.0001 
FISCAL82 1 9.900568 0.24502153 40.407 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.003541 0.00624679 -0.567 0.5708 
SEX 1 3.264242 0.30027631 10.871 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -2.323573 0.24802836 -9.368 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 3.568982 0.36163741 9.869 0.0001 
DEP 1 -0.596549 0.52283247 -1.141 0.2539 
ENTRGRAD 1 -0.987682 0.12219467 -8.083 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -2.576137 0.52196674 -4.935 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.146783 0.02266867 6.475 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 0.010967 0.00906864 1.209 0.2265 
OBLIS 1 0.709126 1.42234190 0.499 0.6181 
SINGLEPL 1 -0.532059 0.96194010 -0.553 0.5802 
MARRPL 1 1.698619 0.42081948 4.036 0.0001 
E4 1 -0.186706 0.00975567 -19.138 0.0001 
E5 1 0.435687 0.00647698 67.267 0.0001 
MINORITY 1 5.795511 0.25995572 22.294 0.0001 
Durbin-Watson D 1.996 
(For Number of Obs.)       57514 
1st Order Autocorrelation  0.002 
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Model: M0DEL7 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NEWTT0E4 (COHORT 79) 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of       Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value      Prob>F 
Model 12 2714694. 4709 226224.53924 1167.983       0.0001 
Error 50782 9835871. 9649 193.68815653 
C Total 50794 12550566 .436 
Root MSE 13.91719 R-square 0.2163 
Dep Mean 27.69168 Adj R-sq 0.2161 
C.V. 50.25765 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard   T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error  Parameter=0   Prob > |TJ 
INTERCEP 1 58.554079 1.10712170 52.889        0.0001 
AGESQ 1 0.004686 0.00481178 0.974        0.3302 
SEX 1 -2.467084 0.19692267 -12.528        0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -2.792464 0.15749259 -17.731        0.0001 
AFQT4 1 2.185068 0.18529324 11.792        0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -6.554987 0.08128244 -80.645        0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -4.437679 0.32742072 -13.553        0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.246476 0.01299345 18.969        0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.009427 0.00706050 -1.335        0.1818 
OBLIS 1 -1.689876 0.70986866 -2.381        0.0173 
SINGLEPL 1 -0.189316 1.20640680 -0.157        0.8753 
MARRPL 1 -1.642574 0.55557695 -2.957       0.0031 
MINORITY 1 1.678688 0.15919779 
85 
10.545        0.0001 
Model: M0DEL8 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NEWTT0E4 (COHORT 82) 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 12 3479043. 7647 289920.31373 1506.222 0.0001 
Error 54461 10482747 .591 192.48173173 
C Total 54473 13961791 .356 
Root . MSE 13.87378 R-square 0.2492 
Dep Mean 28.70138 Adj R-sq 0.2490 
C.V. 48.33837 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 50.936307 1.04236299 48.866 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.000882 0.00348584 -0.253 0.8003 
SEX 1 -0.263105 0.19186935 -1.371 0.1703 
AFQT1 1 -3.734884 0.14513157 -25.734 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 2.184874 0.20745839 10.532 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -7.240272 0.07730145 -93.663 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -2.153021 0.29396609 -7.324 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.125586 0.01312793 9.566 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.002186 0.00508093 -0.430 0.6670 
OBLIS 1 0.147067 1.07532438 0.137 0.8912 
SINGLEPL l -1.009959 0.53768405 -1.878 0.0603 
MARRPL 1 -2.431179 0.25333068 -9.597 0.0001 
MINORITY 1 2.306943 0.16066965 14.358 0.0001 
86 
Model: M0DEL9 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NEWTT0E4 (COHORT 85! 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 12 2628864. 1984 219072.01654 1308.999 0.0001 
Error 58876 9853392. 4338 167.35838769 
C Total 58888 12482256 .632 
Root . MSE 12.93671 R-square 
\ 
0.2106 
Dep Mean 27.21362 Adj R-sq 0.2104 
C.V. 47.53762 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 55.194365 1.30881970 42.171 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 0.017407 0.00417033 4.174 0.0001 
SEX 1 3.099319 0.16625111 18.642 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -6.713188 0.12903642 -52.026 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 2.226526 0.20173861 11.037 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -5.250546 0.07674972 -68.411 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -5.296478 0.36627939 -14.460 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.270732 0.01611438 16.801 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.028341 0.00594166 -4.770 0.0001 
OBLIS 1 0.417699 0.88401091 0.473 0.6366 
SINGLEPL 1 -2.573809 0.57072974 -4.510 0.0001 
MARRPL 1 -2.381132 0.23621230 -10.080 0.0001 
MINORITY 1 2.525669 0.13319517 18.962 0.0001 
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Model: MODEL10 









































12 2088309.8489 174025.82074 














































































Dependent Variable: NEWTTOE5 (COHORT 82) 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 12 1979792. 0054 164982.« 56711 463.952 0.0001 
Error 27066 9624755. 2622 355.60316494 
C Total 27078 1160454'7 .268 
Root MSE 18.85744 R-square 0.1706 




Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 73.613585 2.23717734 32.905 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.006462 0.00698595 -0.925 0.3550 
SEX 1 2.400825 0.38170442 6.290 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -6.917715 0.30040880 -23.028 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 7.075638 0.45951360 15.398 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -4.329440 0.13984573 -30.959 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -3.798901 0.62635653 -6.065 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.210331 0.02807912 7.491 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.001311 0.01013627 -0.129 0.8971 
OBLIS 1 1.068694 2.15229512 0.497 0.6195 
SINGLEPL 1 -0.596021 1.00017721 -0.596 0.5512 
MARRPL 1 -2.700546 0.44608460 -6.054 0.0001 
MINORITY 1 5.108786 0.32320527 15.807 0.0001 
89 
Model: M0DEL12 











12 808595.33818 67382.94485 






Root . MSE 14.49576 R-square 0.1321 
Dep Mean 45.22198 Adj R-sq 0.1317 
C.V. 32.05469 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 69.805953 2.36945736 29.461 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 0.000478 0.00700281 0.068 0.9456 
SEX l 5.034292 0.30605219 16.449 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -7.352252 0.24311410 -30.242 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 3.862167 0.42755377 9.033 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -1.542907 0.11841970 -13.029 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -5.189953 0.65801593 -7.887 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.275719 0.02906786 9.485 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.010493 0.00993927 -1.056 0.2911 
OBLIS 1 -0.362767 1.43854440 -0.252 0.8009 
SINGLEPL 1 -1.975986 0.89445661 -2.209 0.0272 
MARRPL 1 -2.579464 0.36339676 -7.098 0.0001 
MINORITY 1 3.973183 0.24187954 16.426 0.0001 
90 
Model: M0DEL13 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E6 (COHORT 79! 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 12 1577046. 8551 131420.! 57125 187.463 0.0001 
Error 23444 16435338 .182 701.04667216 
C Total 23456 18012385 .037 
Root . MSE 26.47729 R-square 0.0876 
Dep Mean 81.35887 Adj R-sq 0.0871 
C.V. 32.54382 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0   Prob > JT| 
INTERCEP 1 100.622181 3.47475190 28.958 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.032738 0.01381359 -2.370 0.0178 
SEX 1 2.613978 0.54449286 4.801 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -5.287538 0.46080858 -11.474 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 5.840278 0.58341687 10.010 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -2.920620 0.21256098 -13.740 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -3.852935 1.01178548 -3.808 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.269231 0.04137534 6.507 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 0.050345 0.02024696 2.487 0.0129 
OBLIS 1 1.025955 2.26323606 0.453 0.6503 
SINGLEPL 1 2.220348 3.31861706 0.669 0.5035 
MARRPL 1 -1.718147 1.36762982 -1.256 0.2090 
MINORITY 1 9.047602 0.46785494 19.338 0.0001 
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Model: M0DEL14 











12 545487.16806 45457.26400 






Root . MSE 22.17992 R-square 0.0457 
Dep Mean 76.83959 Adj R-sq 0.0453 
C.V. 28.86522 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 95.037302 2.85613267 33.275 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.002984 0.00891713 -0.335 0.7379 
SEX 1 4.956897 0.49184949 10.078 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -4.408320 0.38860381 -11.344 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 2.414100 0.64285974 3.755 0.0002 
ENTRGRAD 1 -1.072026 0.17546848 -6.110 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -4.731868 0.80116370 -5.906 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.255014 0.03582005 7.119 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 0.002961 0.01296250 0.228 0.8193 
OBLIS 1 -3.022658 2.71387589 -1.114 0.2654 
SINGLEPL 1 -1.621578 1.25795097 -1.289 0.1974 
MARRPL 1 1.607673 0.56656825 2.838 0.0045 
MINORITY 1 6.760341 0.43512038 15.537 0.0001 
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Model: M0DEL15 









































12 30730.21120 2560.85093 















































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NEWTT0E4 (COHORT 79) 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 18 2724705. 0357 151372.5 50198 782.231 0.0001 
Error 50776    9825861.4 193.51389239 
C Total 50794 12550566 .436 
Root . MSE 13.91093 R-square 0.2171 
Dep Mean 27.69168 Adj R-sq 0.2168 
C.V. 50.23504 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 58.469049 1.10751540 52.793 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 0.004065 0.00481101 0.845 0.3982 
SEX 1 -2.516764 0.19696578 -12.778 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -2.764498 0.15753265 -17.549 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 2.133461 0.18542628 11.506 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -6.571002 0.08127527 -80.849 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -4.402406 0.32744112 -13.445 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.245921 0.01299231 18.928 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.008255 0.00706177 -1.169 0.2424 
OBLIS 1 -1.693234 0.70961531 -2.386 0.0170 
SINGLEPL 1 -0.317361 1.20600358 -0.263 0.7924 
MARRPL 1 -1.625336 0.55537741 -2.927 0.0034 
BLACK 1 2.211164 0.18068253 12.238 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 0.383734 0.39681727 0.967 0.3335 
OHISP 1 -0.227732 0.91953953 -0.248 0.8044 
MEXICAN 1 -0.002448 0.52791499 -0.005 0.9963 
PUERTRI 1 0.823666 0.72195189 1.141 0.2539 
FILIPIN 1 -1.692225 0.82480138 -2.052 0.0402 
NATIND 1 4.492823 2.07518266 2.165 0.0304 
94 
Model: M0DEL17 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NEWTT0E4 (COHORT 82! 










18 3485898.3178 193661.01765 

















Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 50.911734 1.04236550 48.842 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.000692 0.00348623 -0.198 0.8428 
SEX 1 -0.290262 0.19190739 -1.513 0.1304 
AFQT1 1 -3.709018 0.14522385 -25.540 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 2.168522 0.20743147 10.454 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -7.252526 0.07736402 -93.745 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -2.155811 0.29391994 -7.335 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.125878 0.01312621 9.590 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.002234 0.00508053 -0.440 0.6601 
OBLIS 1 0.139562 1.07510169 0.130 0.8967 
SINGLEPL 1 -1.085367 0.53773925 -2.018 0.0436 
MARRPL 1 -2.397490 0.25334377 -9.463 0.0001 
BLACK 1 2.700553 0.18159640 14.871 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 0.351264 1.15023371 0.305 0.7601 
OHISP 1 1.512815 1.42150103 1.064 0.2872 
MEXICAN 1 0.943340 1.23056629 0.767 0.4433 
PUERTRI 1 1.855892 1.31293057 1.414 0.1575 
FILIPIN 1 -0.341142 0.70003238 -0.487 0.6260 
NATIND 1 3.240728 1.10219139 2.940 0.0033 
95 
Model: MODEL18 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NEWTTOE4 (COHORT 85] 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 18  2635243 .305 146402.40583 875.261 0.0001 
Error 58870 9847013. 3273 167.26708557 
C Total 58888 12482256 .632 
Root . MSE 12.93318 R-square 0.2111 
Dep Mean 27.21362 Adj R-sq 0.2109 
c.v. 47.52465 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 55.043025 1.30919074 42.044 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 0.017318 0.00416948 4.153 0.0001 
SEX 1 3.057923 0.16650710 18.365 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -6.678578 0.12929865 -51.652 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 2.179632 0.20215602 10.782 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -5.271707 0.07686842 -68.581 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -5.265314 0.36629199 -14.375 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.269691 0.01611635 16.734 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.027819 0.00594119 -4.682 0.0001 
OBLIS 1 0.403733 0.88382231 0.457 0.6478 
SINGLEPL 1 -2.653978 0.57078432 -4.650 0.0001 
MARRPL 1 -2.360744 0.23619038 -9.995 0.0001 
BLACK 1 2.835600 0.15547157 18.239 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 2.339705 0.76722966 3.050 0.0023 
OHISP 1 -0.938435 0.94932548 -0.989 0.3229 
MEXICAN 1 -0.111672 0.83720790 -0.133 0.8939 
PUERTRI 1 0.957110 0.89765149 1.066 0.2863 
FILIPIN 1 1.233787 0.51980057 2.374 0.0176 
NATIND 1 1.903776 0.91923897 2.071 0.0384 
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Model: M0DEL19 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E5 (COHORT 79) 





Sum of Mean 
Squares Square F Value Prob>F 
03.6864 116389.09369 240.822 0.0001 
DF 













Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > JT| 
INTERCEP 1 86.924955 2.71063240 32.068 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 0.013997 0.01083583 1.292 0.1965 
SEX 1 -1.143214 0.43253583 -2.643 0.0082 
AFQT1 1 -5.253963 0.36389397 -14.438 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 5.702993 0.44619660 12.781 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -5.435980 0.16873966 -32.215 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -6.971661 0.78983114 -8.827 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.364076 0.03223189 11.296 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.027636 0.01588886 -1.739 0.0820 
OBLIS 1 3.227025 1.73486619 1.860 0.0629 
SINGLEPL 1 2.512191 2.54942905 0.985 0.3244 
MARRPL 1 -2.833963 1.06718825 -2.656 0.0079 
BLACK 1 4.215928 0.40909305 10.306 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 1.518563 0.92899764 1.635 0.1021 
OHISP 1 2.673695 2.18996047 1.221 0.2221 
MEXICAN 1 0.508946 1.22512492 0.415 0.6778 
PUERTRI 1 2.882234 1.55929796 1.848 0.0646 
FILIPIN 1 4.750595 1.53827945 3.088 0.0020 
NATIND 1 -4.504536 5.50192307 -0.819 0.4130 
97 
Model: MODEL2 0 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E5 (COHORT 82: 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of       Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 18 1982136. 0053 110118.66696 309.674 0.0001 
Error 27060 9622411. 2622 355.59539033 
C Total 27078 1160454'7 .268 
Root . MSE 18.85724 R-square 0.1708 
Dep Mean 47.21832 Adj R-sq 0.1703 
C.V. 39.93627 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard   T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error  Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 73.636912 2.23804732 32.902 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.006419 0.00699236 -0.918 0.3586 
SEX 1 2.400594 0.38210656 6.283 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -6.884889 0.30084714 -22.885 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 7.085261 0.45938576 15.423 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -4.326250 0.14010790 -30.878 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -3.817223 0.62650401 -6.093 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.211527 0.02808657 7.531 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.001234 0.01014082 -0.122 0.9032 
OBLIS 1 0.998419 2.15237530 0.464 0.6427 
SINGLEPL 1 -0.673454 1.00086328 -0.673 0.5010 
MARRPL 1 -2.665627 0.44626818 -5.973 0.0001 
BLACK 1 5.502557 0.36771451 14.964 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 1.262055 2.45920799 0.513 0.6078 
OHISP 1 3.285022 3.10857567 1.057 0.2906 
MEXICAN 1 3.150102 2.62462635 1.200 0.2301 
PUERTRI 1 3.500307 2.75138804 1.272 0.2033 
FILIPIN 1 4.388986 1.19723179 3.666 0.0002 
NATIND 1 3.368637 2.18153848 1.544 0.1226 
98 
Model: M0DEL21 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E5 (COHORT 85) 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of       Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value 
Model 18 810298.64177  45016.59121 214.253 
Error 25281 5311782. 7394 210.10967681 
C Total 25299 6122081. 3812 
Root MSE 14.49516 R-square 0.1324 
Dep Mean 45.22198 Adj R-sq 0.1317 
C.V. 32.05335 
" Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard   T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error  Parameter=0   Pr 
INTERCEP 1 69.815849 2.37074435 29.449 
AGESQ 1 0.000491 0.00700336 0.070 
SEX 1 4.983630 0.30707352 16.229 
AFQT1 1 -7.309966 0.24387793 -29.974 
AFQT4 1 3.904856 0.42857629 9.111 
ENTRGRAD 1 -1.551348 0.11862249 -13.078 
HIYREDUC 1 -5.187216 0.65826016 -7.880 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.275912 0.02908001 9.488 
DETERMSQ 1 -0.010294 0.00994101 -1.036 
OBLIS 1 -0.383894 1.43893980 -0.267 
SINGLEPL 1 -1.982615 0.89501623 -2.215 
MARRPL 1 -2.573767 0.36344981 -7.081 
BLACK 1 4.318153 0.28779651 15.004 
HISPANIC 1 1.618237 1.48311198 1.091 
OHISP 1 0.746477 1.79593959 0.416 
MEXICAN 1 1.654104 1.60457437 1.031 
PUERTRI 1 2.088947 1.69784144 1.230 
FILIPIN 1 5.009150 0.80657266 6.210 































Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E6 (COHORT 79! 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of       Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 18  1620119 .954  90006.66411 128.693 0.0001 
Error 23438 16392265 .083 699.38838993 
C Total 23456 18012385 .037 
Root . MSE 26.44595 R-square 0.0899 
Dep Mean 81.35887 Adj R-sq 0.0892 
C.V. 32.50531 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard   T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error  Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 101.787362 3.47511269 29.290 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.030940 0.01380853 -2.241 0.0251 
SEX 1 2.614431 0.54473403 4.799 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -5.209348 0.46089497 -11.303 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 5.622890 0.58402063 9.628 0.0001 
ENTRGRAD 1 -2.903305 0.21246337 -13.665 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -4.094166 1.01148489 -4.048 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.279016 0.04135219 6.747 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 0.046183 0.02025246 2.280 0.0226 
OBLIS 1 0.736609 2.26096445 0.326 0.7446 
SINGLEPL 1 2.156641 3.31524125 0.651 0.5154 
MARRPL 1 -1.599016 1.36646172 -1.170 0.2419 
BLACK 1 10.117809 0.53815908 18.801 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 2.206801 1.19161758 1.852 0.0640 
OHISP 1 7.489435 2.79876905 2.676 0.0075 
MEXICAN 1 2.085939 1.57287623 1.326 0.1848 
PUERTRI 1 6.160490 2.04479817 3.013 0.0026 
FILIPIN 1 19.075752 1.99931012 9.541 0.0001 
NATIND 1 -5.929259 6.61877632 -0.896 0.3704 
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Model: MODEL23 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E6 (COHORT 82) 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 18 557279.86568  30959.99254 62.982 0.0001 
Error 23122   11365996.7 491.56633077 
C Total 23140 11923276 .566 
Root . MSE 22.17130 R-square 0.0467 
Dep Mean 76.83959 Adj R-sq 0.0460 
C.V. 28.85400 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 95.310822 2.85650819 33.366 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.003960 0.00892018 -0.444 0.6571 
SEX 1 4.965352 0.49204620 10.091 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 -4.350976 0.38899812 -11.185 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 2.402283 0.64252633 3.739 0.0002 
ENTRGRAD 1 -1.028276 0.17574188 -5.851 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 -4.784594 0.80108167 -5.973 0.0001 
HIYREDSQ 1 0.258884 0.03582054 7.227 0.0001 
DETERMSQ 1 0.004044 0.01296278 0.312 0.7551 
OBLIS 1 -3.229699 2.71296459 -1.190 0.2339 
SINGLEPL 1 -1.580203 1.25809933 -1.256 0.2091 
MARRPL 1 1.660022 0.56651990 2.930 0.0034 
BLACK 1 7.649706 0.50732693 15.078 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 10.223915 3.17298914 3.222 0.0013 
OHISP 1 -9.211018 4.00461621 -2.300 0.0215 
MEXICAN 1 -8.000040 3.38845289 -2.361 0.0182 
PUERTRI 1 -6.943606 3.56236951 -1.949 0.0513 
FILIPIN 1 10.185705 1.64196451 6.203 0.0001 
NATIND 1 0.278662 2.82122358 0.099 0.9213 
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Model: M0DEL24 
Dependent Variable: NEWTT0E6 (COHORT 85! 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF     Squares      Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 18  40232.22258   2235.: L2348 10.820 0.0001 
Error 14486 2992364 8435 206.56943556 
C Total 14504 3032597 0661 
Root . MSE 14.37252 R-square 0.0133 
Dep Mean 65.72727 Adj R-sq 0.0120 
C.V. 21.86691 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0   Prob > |T| 
INTERCEP 1 57.269258 3.19446126 17.928 0.0001 
AGESQ 1 -0.027460 0.00942307 -2.914 0.0036 
SEX 1 2.574436 0.44862599 5.738 0.0001 
AFQT1 1 1.883401 0.35985781 5.234 0.0001 
AFQT4 1 -1.577712 0.73020521 -2.161 0.0307 
ENTRGRAD 1 0.774260 0.14557445 5.319 0.0001 
HIYREDUC 1 1.316920 0.88664253 1.485 0.1375 
HIYREDSQ 1 -0.038203 0.03877489 -0.985 0.3245 
DETERMSQ 1 0.036661 0.01341907 2.732 0.0063 
OBLIS 1 2.718129 2.10136588 1.294 0.1959 
SINGLEPL 1 1.923638 1.13089079 1.701 0.0890 
MARRPL 1 -0.048768 0.47520310 -0.103 0.9183 
BLACK 1 2.254761 0.47373394 4.760 0.0001 
HISPANIC 1 2.354273 1.89207845 1.244 0.2134 
OHISP 1 -3.597440 2.32976745 -1.544 0.1226 
MEXICAN 1 -2.863159 2.08539485 -1.373 0.1698 
PUERTRI 1 -0.039018 2.32780129 -0.017 0.9866 
FILIPIN 1 8.264582 1.38595286 5.963 0.0001 
NATIND 1 -7.048053 2.43367992 -2.896 0.0038 
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Gender of sailor 
Entry grade at enlistment is E-l 
Entry grade at enlistment is E-2 
Entry grade at enlistment is E-3 
Sailor is still serving in 1992 
Time in service to promotion to E-4 in months 
Time in service to promotion to E-5 in months 
Time in service to promotion to E-6 in months 
Age at enlistment 
Score on the AFQT 
AFQT score above average 
AFQT score below average 
Time in service at discharge in months 
Level of education as in Table III 
Dummy variable for the 1979 Navy enlisted personnel cohort 
Dummy variable for the 1982 Navy enlisted personnel cohort 
Dummy variable for the 1985 Navy enlisted personnel cohort 
Dummy variable for gender (female =1) 
Delayed Entry Program (dummy variable, participation = 1) 
Subtracts educational level from age 
InitiaL term is less or equal to three years (dummy variable, 
yes = 1) 
Single with children (dummy variable, yes = 1) 
Married with children (dummy variable, yes = 1) 
Racial/ethnic minority (dummy variable, yes = 1) 
Blacks (dummy variable, yes = 1) 
Hispanic (dummy variable, yes = 1) 
Mexican Americans (dummy variable, yes = 1) 
Puerto Ricans (dummy variable, yes = 1) 
Filipino-Americans (dummy variable, yes = 1) 
Native Indian American (dummy variable, yes = 1) 
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